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ARGUMENTS
I.

TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST THE DISQUALIFICATION
OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE DUE TO ACTUAL BIAS OR
PREJUDICE OR AT LEAST THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS OR
PREJUDICE.

The

State

argues that

''counsel was not

constitutionally

ineffective for not moving to disqualify Judge Kay."
Appellee, p. 10.

See Brief of

According to the State, "trial counsel did not

perform deficiently for failing to make a futile motion."
at pp. 10-15.

See

id.

The State's argument is contrary to established law

and therefore without merit.
On remand, the following exchange occurred at the outset of
the hearing on remand on March 4, 2 010, in which trial counsel
raised one of the inaccuracies in the PSI:
THE COURT:
MS. GEORGE:
THE COURT:

MS. GEORGE:
THE COURT:

Okay. You still talking about the
attitude orientation paragraph?
Yes, your Honor.
Well, I'm going to tell you,
counsel, and I don't have any
disrespect for you, but I can tell
you that we've been through this.
I've
had Mr. Kucharski
on a case
before
this case, and I've had more
stories
that I have heard that
he
has been rebutted
by a bunch
of
other people
that he's plead
guilty
to and then he comes back and
gets
a
new
attorney
and
then
he
basically
says
all
the same
old
stories
again.
Yes, your Honor.
And so if you want to go through
all these this way, I'm more than
1
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MS. GEORGE:

THE COURT:

MS. GEORGE:
THE COURT:
(R. 278:12:2-24

happy to do it, but I made my
ruling on that.
I'm required to
make the finding. I made a finding
and I'm not going to have things
reargued.
And I understand that, your Honor.
My concern is just then I'm put in
a position as his current counsel
where Mr. Kucharski wanted these
issues addressed.
If I don't
address them then I too am -I'm not faulting you for addressing
them. I'm just telling you what's
the history.
Yes, your Honor.
--of this case and previous cases.

(emphasis added)). 1

At the conclusion of the

hearing, the district court stated the following:
What I would say in response to what we have
done today is all of these changes that you've
made, even if you want to take out the attitude
and orientation change, the problem with this case
and the problem that I didn't go along with what
the plea was, was because Mr. Kucharski had had a
history
with me.
And that paragraph under
investigator comment, the second paragraph, the
first sentence, the defendant has established
instances of repetitive criminal conduct and
continued criminal behavior.
And that was the issue that was critical.
And it was the issue that he was going from
company to company, doing similar types of crime,
and basically thinking he could get away with i t .
That more than anything else - - i t wasn't the dog
license failure. It really wasn't anything about
the -- other than the record that I had had with

l

A true and correct copy of the Sentence Review hearing
transcript, R. 278, is attached as Addendum C to the Brief of
Appellant. An additional copy of the hearing transcript is contained
in the record at R. 275.
2
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him. And despite what the recommendation was by
the county or the defendant was that he deserved
to go to prison because of the continued behavior.
Probation hadn't changed him in the past under
supervised probation, and he continued to commit
crimes.
And so I'm stating as a matter of fact and
law that all the inaccuracies that have been
addressed here that I have agreed to and agreed to
what Mr. Kucharski said would not and will not
change the sentence that I gave him to go to zero
to five years in prison.
So I do not see any
reason to revise the sentence because those things
did not affect it.
(R. 278:36-37 (emphasis added)).
According to the Utah Supreme Court, a trial judge "should
recuse

himself

questioned."

when
State

x

his

impartiality'

v. Neeley,

might

748 P. 2d

(emphasis added), cert, denied,

reasonably be

1091,

1094 (Utah)

487 U.S. 1220, 108 S.Ct. 2876

(1988) (citing Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 3(C) (1) (b) (1981)) ;2
see also

State

denied,

v. Gardner,

789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert.

494 U.S. 1090, 110 S. Ct. 1837 (1990)

(emphasizing that

"[n]othing is more damaging to the public confidence in the legal
system than the appearance
judge.")

(emphasis

Appearances
B.Y.U.
2

Matter:

L. Rev.

The
in State
1220, 108
citation,

of bias

added));

Recusal

or prejudice
see

also

on the part of the
Dmitry

and the Appearance

943, 1000 (2011)

(proposing

Bam,

of Bias,

Making

2 011

implementation of

State refused to address the Utah Supreme Court's decision
v. Neeley,
748 P.2d 1091 (Utah), cert, denied,
487 U.S.
S.Ct. 2876 (1988). Moreover, the State's brief contains no
whatsoever, to
Neeley.
3
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systemic

"appearance-based"

procedural

recusal

rules

and

recommending that focus be on appearances of partiality).

The

Court further dictated that recusal based on this standard "should
Neeley,

be given careful consideration by the trial judge."
P. 2d at 1094.

748

In fact, u[i]t may require recusal in instances
Id.;

where no actual bias is shown."
UT App 275, 34 P. 3d 234
determination that

see

also

State

v.

West,

2001

(reiterating the Utah Supreme Court's

"actual bias need not be found to support

disqualification" and that "'appearance of bias or prejudice is
sufficient for disqualification'", noting that "'disqualification
due to the appearance of bias or prejudice seems more amenable to
prospective application.'")
Sav.

& Loam Ass'n,

(quoting Madsen

v.

Prudential

Fed.

767 P.2d 538, 544 n.5 (Utah 1988)).

Contrary to the State's assertion, the instant case involves
more than an attitude of the trial
matter" of the lawsuit.
P.2d

997; State

v.

Cf.

Munguia,

In

re

judge about

Young,

the

"subject

1999 UT 81, f 35, 984

2011 UT 5, U 17, 253 P.3d 1082.

Throughout the remand proceeding in the instant case, the trial
judge demonstrated actual bias or prejudice against Defendant by
various personal comments concerning Defendant.
comments

indicated

"a

strong

personal

The trial judge's

bias

or

prejudice

concerning" Defendant or "a strong personal bias involving an
issue in" the case.

Munguia,

2011 UT 5 at 1 17.
4
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Moreover, the

trial judge's comments demonstrated a predetermined decision based
on this strong personal bias or prejudice against Defendant.

Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance
Judge's

Impartiality

Might

of Impropriety:

Reasonably

Deciding

Be Questioned,

See

When a

14 Geo. J.

Legal Ethics 55, 59-60 (2000).3
Defendant's trial counsel - with the exercise of reasonable
diligence - should have realized the bias or prejudice grounds
upon which to request the disqualification of Judge Kay in the
instant case.

The failure to request disqualification constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel.

Trial counsel's failure fell

below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,
which is demonstrated by existing Utah case law concerning the
standard for disqualification,

including the Code of Judicial

Conduct, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, and the personal
comments of the trial judge demonstrating at least an appearance
if not an actual bias or prejudice in this case.
Appearance

of

Impropriety,

14

Geo.

J.

Legal

See Abramson,
Ethics

at

66

(promoting the premise for the standard that "the appearance of
fairness

is

as

important

as

fairness

itself.")

(citations

omitted)).

3

A true and correct copy of Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance

Impropriety:

Deciding

When a Judge's

Impartiality

Might

of

Reasonably

Be Questioned,
14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 55 (2000) is attached to this
Brief as Addendum A.
5
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Addressing reversible error based on a trial judge's failure
to recuse, the Utah Supreme Court stated:

But, while we recommend the practice
that a judge
recuse himself
where there is a colorable
claim of
bias or prejudice,
absent a showing of actual bias
or an abuse of discretion, failure to do so does
not constitute reversible error as long as the
requirements of [Utah R. Crim. P. 29] are met.
Neeley,

748 P.2d

at

1094-95

Bassett and Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive
97

Iowa

L.

Rev.

181

(2011)

approach to judicial recusal).

cf.

(emphasis added);

(identifying

Goal of
flaws

Debra

Lyn

Impartiality,
with

current

The comments made by Judge Kay in

the instant case demonstrate actual bias or prejudice against
Defendant.

If not actual bias or prejudice, the comments, at the

very least, demonstrate

the appearance of bias or prejudice.

Contrary to the State's assertion that prejudice is not shown,
Judge Kay's comments colored the entire remand proceeding by
demonstrating

a

refusal

to

impartially

consider

both

the

corrections to the PSI and how they might lead to a different
outcome at sentencing.

See R. 278:37:6-11

(where trial judge,

after making numerous corrections to the PSI, determined, as a
matter of course, that the inaccuracies "would not and will not
change the sentence that I gave him . . . . " ) .

The comments of

bias and prejudice in the instant case cast a shadow of suspicion
on the trial judge's fairness and consideration given to the

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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See Haslam

inaccuracies presented by Defendant to the court.
Morrison,
Making

113 Utah 14, 20, 190 P.2d 520
Appearances

(emphasizing

that

Matter,

2011

" [r] ecusal

(1948); see also

B.Y.U.

lies

at

L.

Rev.

the

Bam,

at

heart

v.

10 03
of

understanding of the role of the courts in a democracy.

our

It is

meant to ensure judicial independence and impartiality and to
protect the legitimacy of the courts as well as the reputation of
the judiciary").
Had trial counsel moved for disqualification, there is a
reasonable

likelihood, based on Judge Kay's comments, that a

recusal would have occurred or that another judge would have been
assigned to the case.

However, because trial counsel failed to

file such a motion, Defendant was precluded from even having the
disqualification matter duly considered.

See Utah R. Crim. P.

29(c) .
The failure of trial counsel to move for disqualification
does not constitute sound trial strategy.
demonstrated

actual

or

at

least

the

The judge's comments

appearance

of

bias

or

prejudice against Defendant -- and there was nothing detrimental
to Defendant in moving for such a disqualification as dictated by
the procedures in Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.

Based on

the actual bias or prejudice shown and the circumstances of this
case,

but

for

counsel's

unprofessional

errors,

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

there

is

a

reasonable probability that the results of the sentence review
would

have

Strickland4

been different.
test

have

been

Inasmuch

as both prongs

established,

the

of

the

proceeding

is

See Bell

v.

inherently unreliable and the result cannot stand.
Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 695, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (2002).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and that set forth in the Brief of
Appellant, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court set
aside Judge Kay's review of his sentence in the instant case and
remand

the case for further proceedings

consistent

with this

Court's decision concerning recusal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of November, 2011.
ARNOLD t wteGINS, P.C.
I

Counsel for^Appellant
'-J^opei:

4

See Strickland
v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 2052
(1984); Bundy v. Deland,
763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v.
Perry,
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright,
893
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
8
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ADDENDA
Addendum A:

Leslie

W.

Impropriety:
Impartiality

Abramson,

"Appearance

Deciding
When
Might Reasonably Be

14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 55 (2000)
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Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When
A Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably
Be Questioned"
LESLIE W. ABRAMSON*
INTRODUCTION

The American Bar Association's Codes of Judicial Conduct* are the foundation for judicial discipline and disqualification in American courts. Forty-nine of
the states have adopted some form of the American Bar Association ("AB A")
Codes. They apply to legal and quasi-legal proceedings, full-time and part-time
judges, as well as to judicial discipline. One of the most frequently invoked
standards in the Codes expresses a concern that a particular fact situation requires
judicial disqualification, because the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.2
The Codes of Judicial Conduct refer throughout to the appearance of
impropriety.3 For disqualification4 or discipline as a remedy for the appearance of

* Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
1. In 1924, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted thirty-four Canons of Judicial
Ethicsy which were adopted verbatim or in an amended version by a majority of the states over the next fifty
years. In 1972, an ABA Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct chaired by California Chief Justice
Roger Traynor completed three years of work and persuaded the ABA House of Delegates to adopt higher and
more explicit standards of judicial conduct. The House of Delegates adopted a revised Model Code of Judicial
Conduct in 1990.
2. Whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned is also referred to as the appearance of
partiality, the appearance of impropriety, or negative appearances.
3. Canon 1 of the 1990 Code states that "[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice
in our society," raising the issue of whether all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of disqualification.
See Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350, 357 (Ala. 1984). Canon 2 of the 1990 Code states a broad judicial
ethical duty to "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities." Canon 4 of
the 1972 Code is somewhat narrower when it proclaims that, subject to the proper performance of judicial
duties, judges may engage in activities to improve the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice if
in doing so the judges do not cast doubt on their capacity to decide impartially any issue that may submitted to
them.
4. Although most courts use the terms disqualification and recusal interchangeably, one court has noted a
distinction between the terms.
When the facts of a case present possible bias on the part of a trial judge, or the appearance of bias, the
party who sees that possible bias or appearance of bias has the duty of moving for recusal. It becomes
the judge's responsibility to initiate the action of removing himself from the case . . . only when he is
disqualified. Generally, the grounds for recusal are as well known to the parties as they are to the
judge, but facts leading to disqualification are often known only to the judge.
When disqualification is required, the duty is squarely placed upon the judge to disqualify himself.
Consequently, the judge's failure to disqualify himself in a particular case, when required to do so by

55
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GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol.

14:55

impropriety, Canon 3 sets forth a general standard of disqualification for any
proceeding in which the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."5
Currently, the meaning and application of the standard is left to the discretion6 of
the trial judge, with little or no guidance from the Codes about the exercise of that
discretion..
For almost three decades, America's state judges have applied the Code of
Judicial Conduct to their own conduct as well as to their judicial colleagues. Too
often, for lack of guiding principles, reviewing courts and judicial conduct
organizations have not analyzed fully the relation between the judge's conduct
and the appearance of partiality. It is time for the ABA and the states to review
their Codes in order to: (1) add ethical duties not currently addressed, such as a
black-letter judicial duty to disclose any known disqualifying circumstances to
counsel and parties;7 (2) broaden existing duties like the judge's duty to inform
himself or herself about personal and family financial holdings;8 and (3) consider
new disqualifying conditions to reclassify general appearance of partiality
situations as specific per se grounds for recusal.9 The ABA and the states are
capable of providing additional guidance, whether in the form of new black-letter
standards or as added commentary language offered as a relevant analytical tool.
Part I of this Article examines the Codes' standards relating to the appearance
of impropriety, the accompanying Code commentary," waiver of disqualifying
situations, and a comparison with attorneys' ethics rules about the appearance
issue. Part II looks at judicial approaches to the appearance of impropriety,
including its rationale, judicial disclosure of possible grounds for the existence of
a negative appearance, the presumption of impartiality and the reasonable person
standard by which appearances are measured, and whether an ethical violation
for negative appearances requires a remedy such as a new trial or is merely
harmless error.
Part III of the Article studies the state court case law in nine factual contexts
where the appearance of impropriety is often raised. The first five situations

the Canons, may subject the judge to an inquiry if a complaint is filed with the Judicial Inquiry
Commission, whereas, the judge's ruling on a recusal motion is reviewable on a mandamus petition
filed in the appropriate appellate court.
Ex Parte Cotton, 638 So.2d 870, 871-72 (Ala. 1994).
5. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3C(1) (1972).
6. When the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify, the appellate standard of review is whether the trial
judge's ruling constituted an abuse of that discretion. See, e.g., In re Margaret Susan P., 733 A.2d 38, 42 (Vt.
1999); Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1237 (Conn. 1998); State v. Wood, 967 R2d 702,
709 (Idaho 1998); Farren v. Commonwealth, 516 S.E.2d 253, 256 (Va. Ct. App. 1999); Kinard v. Kinard, 986
S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Haskins, 573 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
7. See infra notes 30-32 and 54 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
9. As discussed in Part III, the ABA recently approved such an addition regarding campaign contributors. See
infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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consider the effect of judicial remarks, the types of cases judges can hear in light
of prior associations, professional associations with lawyers, other judges and
organizations, and charges of wrongdoing filed by or against the judge. The other
four categories are more personal to the judge, including the judge's personal
connection to a proceeding, family relationships, social and business relationships, and campaign activity. Following each section, there is a discussion of
standards and criteria that should be added to the ABA Codes and commentary to
assist judges, lawyers, and lay members of judicial conduct organizations in
evaluating judicial disqualification or discipline.
I. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT STANDARDS

A. CODE STANDARDS
Both modern versions of the AB A's Model Code of Judicial Conduct impose a
duty upon a judge to disqualify himself or herself "in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited
to"10 a list of specific situations where the likelihood of prejudice or its
appearance is presumed.11 Although most courts have construed the 1972 Code's
"should disqualify" to signify a mandatory12 duty, disqualification under Canon 3

10. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (1990). Instead of the ABA Code's phrase "the judge's

impartiality might reasonably be questioned," California substitutes the phrase "disqualification is required by
law." CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3E (1999). Alabama adds the phrase "is required by law" to its Code
language. ALA. CANON OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3C(1) (1999). Louisiana adds the phrase "in which
disqualification is required by law or applicable Supreme Court rule" to its version of the Code. LA. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1999). In its commentary, Wisconsin refers to its statute mandating
disqualification under enumerated circumstances. Wis. SUP. CT. R. 60.04, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 60.04(4)

cmt. (1999).
Several states use the "might reasonably be questioned" standard to govern the participation of other court personnel
as well as judicial conduct commission members. For involvement of court personnel in a proceeding, see, e.g., N.H.
SUPREME CT. R. 46 Canon 3C(1) (1999) (law clerks); MASS. SUP. JUD. COURT R. 3:12 Canon 4<E) (1999) (clerk of

court); PA. RULES OF SUP. Cr. § 65.10 (1999) (court staff); S.C. APP. CT. R. 506 Canon 3E (1999) (staff attorney or law
clerk). For application of the standard to judicial conduct committee member participation in a matter, see, e.g., N.H.
SUP. CT. R. 40(2)(f) (1999); LA. STATE JUDICIAL COMM'N R. XII (1999); MASS. RULES OF COMM'N ON JUD. CONDUCT R.
12B (1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, §257:1-1-5 (1999); PA. Cr. RULES ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE R. 5C(2) (1999); WASH.
RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. COMM'N R. 3(e)(1) (1999).

11.
Although the specific standards cover most of the situations in which the disqualification issue will
arise, the general standard should not be overlooked. Any conduct that would lead a reasonable
[person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge's "impartiality might
reasonably be questioned" is a basis for the judge's disqualification.
E. Wayne Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct, A.B.A. 60 (1973).
The Codes of California and Louisiana contain no list of specific examples of disqualification. CAL. CODE OF
JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3E (1999); LA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1999).

12. See, e.g., James v. James, 656 N.E.2d 399,404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); State v. Laughlin, 508 N.W.2d 545,
547 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Carlson, 833 P.2d 463,467 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). But see Mitchell v. Class,
524 N.W.2d 860, 863 (S.D. 1994) ("should" not mandatory).
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clearly became mandatory in the 1990 Code by substitution of the word "shall"
for "should."13 As the Preamble to the 1990 Code attempts to explain:
When the text uses "shall" or "shall not," it is intended to impose binding
obligations the violation of which can result in disciplinary action. When
"should" or "should not" is used, the text is intended as hortatory and as a
statement of what is or is not appropriate conduct but not as a binding rule
under which a judge may be disciplined.I4
Although the 1990 Code fails to define any of the terms in the phrase "the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned," a close reading focuses on
the phrase "might reasonably." If dictionary definitions are indicative of how a
word is to be understood, judges perhaps should be wary of rejecting a motion to
disqualify for the appearance of partiality. When the dictionary meaning of
"might" includes "expressing especially a shade of doubt or a lesser degree of
possibility,"15 use of that term in the Code would seem to require "a judge to err
on the side of caution by favoring recusal to remove any reasonable doubt as to
his or her impartiality."16
The use of the term "reasonably" suggests that the viewpoint for assessing the
presence of an appearance of impropriety is not from the perspective of the judge
whose continued control of the case is at issue. In part to promote public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, states use a reasonable person
standard to decide the existence of an appearance of impropriety.17 What purpose
does the term "reasonably" serve? Does it operate to affect the care a judge
exercises before deciding whether to preside in a case? In other words, if "might"
suggests a cautious approach to remaining in a case when there is a concern about
appearances, "reasonably" suggests that such caution should be used only if a
reasonable person would conclude an appearance of impropriety was present.
Thus, a judge who subjectively believes that there is no appearance problem
nevertheless may be persuaded to recuse if the reasonable person would find an
appearance. Conversely, an overly cautious judge who leans toward recusal

13. Of the forty-nine states that have adopted some form of the ABA Code, most use the term "shall" to
describe the judge's responsibility to disqualify: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
The following states use the term "should:" Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Washington.
Michigan's standard simply states that "a judge 'is' disqualified when the judge cannot impartially hear a
case." MCR 2.003(B).
14. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1990).
15. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 859 (3d ed. 1997).
16. Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
17. See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
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whenever anyone raises an appearance problem may decide to remain in a case if
a reasonable person could discover no appearance of impropriety.18
What is the relation between the general standard of the appearance of
partiality and the specific per se examples of disqualifying conditions where
unfairness and bias are assumed? Is disqualification confined to the enumerated
examples that follow the rule, so that a fact pattern not included in that
"laundry-list" does not require disqualification? Because the language following
the general rule mandates recusal "including but not limited to" the specific
examples, state courts interpret and apply the appearance of partiality beyond the
rule's explicit illustrations.19 A judge's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned," then, "regardless of the source or circumstances giving rise to the
question of impartiality and even though the source and circumstances may be
beyond the judge's volition or control."20
The appearance of partiality thus functions as an inclusive "catch-all"
provision available as the source for evaluating recusal in two situations: (1)
when facts do not altogether match the language of the specific examples;21 or (2)
when the situation obviously falls outside the specific scenarios. In either case,
the general rule operates as a "fall-back" position for any judge or party
considering judicial disqualification. In Voeltz v. John Morrell & Co.,22 the court
identified the disqualifying appearance of impropriety alternative to actual bias as
"the existence of circumstances that lead to the conclusion that an unacceptable
risk of actual bias or prejudgment inhered in the proceeding."23
Before finding an appearance of partiality, some courts require evidence of a
judge's actual or potential bias.24 As noted, a consequence of the "including but
not limited to" language of the ABA Model Codes is that the specific "laundry

18. See State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Iowa 1994) ("there is as much obligation for a judge not to
recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is"), quoting Hinman v.
Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
19. See, e.g., Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384 (Del. 1991) ("the designated instances prompting
disqualification do not exhaust all situations in which a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned");
State ex rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) ("judge's duty to disqualify is not
confined to the factors listed . . . but is much broader").
20. Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. 1995).
21. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 185 (Conn. 1996) ("record shows that the judge possessed an
actual bias against the defendant or, at least, that there existed a reasonable question concerning his
impartiality").
Cf. King v. State, 271 S.E.2d 630, 633 (Ga. 1980). In King, the court found that a district attorney-now-judge
had served as a lawyer in the matter in violation of Canon 3C(l)(b). However, because the court found no actual
bias, it held that the appearance of partiality sufficed for the judge's disqualification. Compare Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 (1974) (appearance of partiality standard is no broader than the specific sections that
follow it in federal judicial disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C, § 455).
22. Voeltz v. John Morrell & Co., 564 N.W.2d 315 (S.D. 1997).
23. /(/.at317.
24. See, e.g., State v. Putnam, 675 A.2d 422,425 (Vt. 1996); State v. Dominguez, 914 R2d 141, 144 (Wash.
Ct.App. 1996).
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list" examples do not anticipate every possible factual situation in which a
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Given the relative ease of
making an allegation of negative appearances, the need for proof is vital when the
justification for recusal is the residual "might reasonably be questioned"
language. Thus, allegations about the appearance of impropriety require that
"each such case must be evaluated on its own facts."25
B. CODE COMMENTARY
In both modern Codes of Judicial Conduct, the ABA supplements its ethical
principles with a commentary adopted by most26 states. Consistent with the 1990
Code's Preamble, states view the commentary not as a statement of additional
rules but instead as guidance to the interpretation of the Canons}1 The
commentairy for Canon 3C(1) of the 1972 Code twice refers to the appearance of
impropriety standard. It notes that: (1) "a judge formerly employed by a
governmental agency . . . should disqualify himself in a proceeding if his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned;"28 and (2) "[t]he fact that a lawyer
in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a lawyer-relative of the
judge is affiliated . . . may require" the judge's disqualification if his impartiality
thereby might reasonably be questioned.29
In three paragraphs, the 1990 Code commentary for Canon 3E(1)30 attempts to
explain the context for its use in more detail. In the first paragraph, the ABA states
that the disqualification standard of "whenever the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned" is relevant "regardless of whether any of the specific

25. Joyner v. Commissioner of Correction, 7.40 A.2d 424, 428 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
26. The following states have not adopted either Code's commentary for the appearance of partiality
disqualification standard: Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Vermont.
27. See, e.g., PETA v. Bobby Berosini, 894 P.2d 337, 340 n.5 (Nev. 1995). To underscore the "guidance"
function of the commentary, the Arizona Supreme Court cited as "illuminating" a portion of the 1972 Code's
commentary, which at the time it had not formally adopted. State ex rel. Corbin v. Superior Court, 748 P.2d
1184, 1185 (Ariz. 1987).
28. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C cmt. (1972). Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have adopted this portion of the commentary substantially or
verbatim.
29. Id. This provision has been adopted substantially or verbatim by Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
30. The following states have adopted all or substantially all of the three paragraphs of the ABA's 1990 Code
of Judicial Conduct: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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rules . . . apply."31 As an example, the commentary states that a judge who is in
the process of negotiating for employment with a law firm is disqualified from
presiding in any matter in which the law firm appears, due to the appearance of
partiality.32 If the ABA believes that disqualification is necessary in that context
without regard to additional facts, it is curious that the ABA did not simply
include this factual context in the list of specific instances requiring disqualification, especially because the judge is subject to lawyer discipline for that same
activity under the AB A's Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys.33
The commentary's second paragraph notes that "[a] judge should disclose on
the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might
consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes
that there is no real basis for disqualification."34 Aside from using the hortatory
"should," what is the purpose of this communication from the judge to the parties
and counsel? Assume that the judge indeed discloses information that he or she
believes the participants "might" find to be germane. If counsel believes that the
judge has offered insufficient factual information, can she effectively depose the
judge by asking for particulars?33 Would the purpose of uncovering such detail be
to convince the judge that there is a valid basis for disqualification due to the
appearance of partiality? Even without questioning the judge, the disclosure

31. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990).
32. Virginia is the only state adopting the 1990 Code's commentary that omitted the example provided by the
ABA. VA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1999).
See Voeltz v. John Morrell & Co., 564 N.W.2d 315, 319 (S.D. 1997) (administrative law judge should have
disclosed negotiations for employment with one of the parties; denial of motion for remand made four days after
adverse opinion was reversed).
33. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.12(b), as amended, states in part that "[a] lawyer shall not
negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter in
which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, or
arbitrator." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.12(b) (1999). Unlike the judicial ethical standard,
Rule 1.12(b) does not provide for a waiver. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 9 Disciplinary
Rule 9-101(A) states that a "lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter upon the merits of which he
has acted in a judicial capacity." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 Disciplinary Rule
9-101(A)(1983).
34. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990). Disclosure is a necessary prerequisite to a
waiver of disqualification. Even the commentary's aspirational call for disclosure in states adopting the 1990
Code can facilitate development of a "culture" that mandates disclosure about any information that may be
deemed relevant to disqualification issues. The culture of disclosure can be furthered in states adopting either
version of the Code through issuance of advisory opinions from judicial conduct organizations that require
disclosure. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994) (after trial, defendant's attorney wrote to the
trial judge to verify information obtained after trial that the judge had been the victim of sexual abuse as a child;
judge confirmed the information but stated that he had not thought about his own experience prior to defendant's
trial; trial judge did recuse himself from defendant's postconviction proceeding); State v. Montini, 730 A.2d 76,.,
84 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (upholds trial court's denial of counsel's request to answer series of questions about
judge's affiliations with child advocacy organizations, the judge's writings on child advocacy, and to ask
reasonable questions raised by the judge's answers). Cf Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390 (N.H.
1992) ("[n]either the client nor his attorney have [sic] any obligation to investigate the judge's impartiality").
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might convince the parties and counsel about the judge's candid approach to the
circumstances and about the necessity for seeking the judge's disqualification.36
Or, the disclosure may permit them to build a record by having their motion for
disqualification denied, knowing that a judge who did not recuse sua sponte is
unlikely to do so in response to a motion for recusal.
The third paragraph of the commentary codifies the common law urule of
necessity," which "may override the rule of disqualification."37 Even if a judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the commentary recognizes that a
judge "might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary
statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate
judicial action."38
C. REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION
The states are split about whether disqualification for the appearance of
partiality is waivable.39 From the public's perspective, permitting the parties to
waive disqualification where a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned may be troubling. Instead of withdrawing from the case, each version of

36. Nebraska elevated the second paragraph of the commentary into its Code. NEB. CODE OF JUDICIAL
Canon 3E(3) (1999).
Florida's commentary to Canon 3E adds the following to the second paragraph: "Neither the fact that the
judge conveys this information nor the fact that a lawyer or party has previously filed a complaint against the
judge with the Judicial Qualifications Commission automatically requires the judge to be disqualified, and the
issue instead should be resolved on a case-by-case basis." FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) cmt.
(1999).
37. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990). Of the Canon 3E commentary, California
adopted only the third paragraph. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3E cmt (1999).
State courts occasionally note the tension between two other fundamental judicial policies: a judge's duty to
decide cases, sometimes known as the "duty to sit," and the necessity for the judge to be a neutral and impartial
decision maker. The United States Constitution and Supreme Court precedent provide the foundation of the duty
to sit. See U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 1 (judicial power vested in a supreme court, and inferior courts established by
the Congress); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 180 (1803) (it is the province and duty of "judicial
department" under Constitution to decide cases; judge's oath to support Constitution requires judge to exercise
judicial power and decide cases consistent with fundamental law). The duty to sit may compel consideration of
"whether cases may be unfairly prejudiced or unduly delayed, or discontent may be created through unfounded
charges of prejudice or unfairness made against the judge." Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc.,
459 S.E.2d 374, 385 (W.Va. 1995). The Code of Judicial Conduct's rules for disqualification suggest that the
appearance of partiality outweighs the duty of a judge to sit and decide a particular case. Even a judge who is in
fact impartial and willing to do his or her best to "weigh the scales of justice equally between contending
parties" may have to recuse to satisfy the appearance of impartiality. Crowell v. May, 676 So.2d 941, 944 (Ala.
Civ.App. 1996).
38. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990). Only in the latter situation must the judge
disclose on the record the basis for the disqualification; then the judge must "use reasonable efforts to transfer
the matter to another judge as soon as practicable."
39. Two years after adopting a Code of Judicial Conduct, the Judicial Conference of the United States
amended its Code of Judicial Conduct in 1975 by explicitly disallowing a waiver of disqualification "under any
circumstances." CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, 69 F.R.D. 273, 279 (1975). Four years
later, the federal Code was amended again to reinstate the possibility of waiver of an appearance of partiality.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3D (1999). See 150 ER.D. 307 (1992).
CONDUCT
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the Code allows the judge to disclose on the record certain bases for
disqualification. Thereafter, the parties and lawyers, without participation by the
judge, must all agree that the judge's recusal is unnecessary.
The states disallowing waiver for the appearance of partiality either omit any
reference to the possibility of waiver40 or are based upon the 1972 Code, which
permits a written waiver only for specified family relationships and financial
interests.41 The 1990 Code is far more permissive than the 1972 Code's cautious
approach. It permits waiver as part of the record for all recusals, except for
personal bias or prejudice.42 For a valid waiver, then, the judge must disclose the
basis for disqualification,43 all parties44 and counsel must agree without any
judicial influence, and that agreement must be in writing45 or on the record.

40. The following states do not address the issue of waiver in their codes: California, Connecticut, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia.
41.
Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3C(l)(c) or Canon 3C(l)(d)
may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of his
disqualification. If, based upon such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's
participation, all agree in writing that the judge's relationship is immaterial or that his financial
interest is insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified, and may participate in the proceeding. The
agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D (1972). The states disallowing waiver, under the above or a
comparable provision, for the appearance of partiality are Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland,
Mississippi, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Washington.
42.

Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3E may disclose on the
record the basis of the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider,
out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis
for disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers,
without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is
then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3F (1990). The provision applies in Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Alaska's waiver provision is broader than the ABA rule in that it prohibits waiver when the judge believes that he or
she cannot be fair and impartial or when waiver is not permitted by statute (the grounds for which are cited in its
commentary). On the other hand, even if the parties agree to waiver, the judge is not bound by their decision. The judge
also may ask the parties about their position on waiver, and can tell them that their failure to act on the waiver will be
construed either as a decision to waive or not to waive. ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3F( 1M4) (1999).
43. See, e.g., Reems v. St. Joseph's Hosp. and Health Center, 536 N.W.2d 666, 676 n.3 (N.D. 1995) (with no
prior disclosure there cannot be even implied remittal).
44. See, e.g., Woods v. Durkin, 539 N.E.2d 920,922-23 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (oral waiver by attorneys only is
insufficient). See also City of Prattville v. Joyner, 698 So.2d 122, 124 n.l (Ala. 1997) (when all parties did not
sign a remittal of disqualification, trial judge transferred case to another judge).
45. See, e.g., James v. James, 656 N.E.2d 399, 405 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (oral waiver insufficient); Woods,
539 N.E.2d at 922-23 (oral waiver by attorneys only is insufficient).
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Presumably when the record shows no agreement, the judge does not know who
refused to sign.46
D. ATTORNEYS' ETHICS RULES COMPARED
While judges must remain sensitive to appearances, current lawyers' ethics standards
take a more skeptical view of the appearance of partiality. In the 1969 ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, Canon Nine announces that a "lawyer
should avoid even the appearance of impropriety.'*47 The ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, adopted in 1983, address the problems of the term "appearance
of impropriety" for dealing with conflict of interest issues.
[S]ince "impropriety" is undefined, the term "appearance of impropriety" is
question-begging. It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of
disqualification cannot be properly resolved . . . by the very general concept of
appearance of impropriety.
Despite the disrespect accorded to the "appearance of impropriety" in the Model
Rules, several courts by decision48 or by rule49 have ignored the criticism and
continue to recognize the concept.
46.
To assure that consideration of the question of remittal is made independently of the judge, a judge
must not solicit, seek or hear comment on possible remittal or waiver of the disqualification unless the
lawyers jointly propose remittal after consultation as provided in the rule. A party may act through
counsel if counsel represents on the record that the party has been consulted and consents. As a
practical matter, the judge may wish to have all parties and their lawyers sign the remittal agreement.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL COISTDUCT Canon 3F cmt. (1990).

47. MODEL, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1983). Two of Canon Nine's aspirational ethical
considerations state that only responsible and proper conduct by attorneys promotes the public's confidence in the legal
system and the legal profession and that every lawyer "owes a solemn duty . . . to strive to avoid not only professional
impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY Canon 9 EC 9-2,

9-6 (1983). Ethical Consideration 5-6 also mentions the appearance of impropriety with regard to the care that needs to
be taken by an attorney when the client wants to name the lawyer as executor, trustee or lawyer in an instrument. Canon
9's Disciplinary Rule 9-101 is titled "Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety/' and the specific sections address
not accepting private employment in a matter where the lawyer either already acted as judge or had substantial
responsibility as a public employee, and not stating or implying the ability to influence improperly courts, legislatures, or
public officials.
48. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997). While acknowledging that the Model
Rules reject the appearance of impropriety standard and that the standard is "vague and leads to uncertain
results," the court stated:
[The standard] nonetheless serves the useful function of stressing that disqualification properly may
be imposed to protect the reasonable expectations of former and present clients. The impropriety
standard also promotes the public's confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. For these
reasons, courts still retain the appearance of impropriety standard as an independent basis of
assessment.
Id. at 468. The court also recognized that Kentucky's commentary "specifically rejects the 'appearance of
impropriety' standard."
49. • R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2) of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct states:
(c) This rule shall not alter the effect of case law or ethics opinions to the effect that:
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II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO CODE INTERPRETATION

A. RATIONALE FOR THE APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY
Judicial discourse about the appearance of partiality often includes an
explanation of the rationale for the standard. Even the United States Supreme
Court occasionally has contributed to the discussion, primarily as a matter of
constitutional due process. In re Murchison50 was a due process case in which the
same judge who acted as a "one-judge grand jury" in bringing contempt charges
also could preside over the contempt hearing. In reversing the judgments of
conviction, the Court opined on the appearance created by the situation.
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of
course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To
this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try
cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined
with precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered. This
Court has said, however, that "Every procedure which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear,
and true between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law."
Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias
and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between
contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way "justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice."51
Three decades later, the Court found a due process violation when an Alabama
Supreme Court Justice cast the deciding vote in a case involving the same issue
which he personally was litigating in a trial court.52 The Court made clear that it
was unnecessary to decide whether in fact the judge was influenced. Instead, it
was sufficient for a due process violation that his sitting in the appellate case

(2) in certain cases or situations creating an appearance of impropriety rather than an actual
conflict, multiple representation is not permissible, that is, in those situations in which an
ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts would conclude that the multiple
representation poses substantial risk of disservice to either the public interest or the interest of
one of the clients.
The President of the New Jersey State Bar Association, in an article calling for an elimination of the standard
from the New Jersey rules, termed the "appearance of impropriety" standard "an archaic rule bottomed in
vagueness and arbitrariness, which promotes 'rampant ad hocery' and defies rational definition." Cynthia M.
Jacob, A Polemic Against R.RC 1.7(c): The "Appearance of Impropriety" Rule, N.J. LAW., June 1996.
50. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
51. Id. at 136, quoting Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (due process violation when
defendant is tried by judge who is paid only when there is conviction) and Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,
14 (1954) (judge who became personally embroiled with attorney during trial cannot sentence attorney for
contempt).
52. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
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would offer a possible temptation to the average "judge not to hold the balance
nice, clear, and true."53
Because the Congress in 1973 adopted a parallel54 code of conduct for federal
judges,55 the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to interpret the federal
statute. In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corporation,56 the trial judge
claimed that he had forgotten about his position as a trustee of a university that
had an interest in the litigation. Noting the legislative history of the statute, the
Court stated that its purpose was "to promote public confidence in the integrity of
the judicial process."57 The Court next cited with approval the Fifth Circuit's
language upholding the importance of a recusal standard based upon the
appearance of partiality.
The goal of [the statute] is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would
appear" to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of the facts that
would give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is
created even though no actual partiality exists because the judge does not recall
the facts, because the judge actually has no interest in the case or because the
judge is pure in heart and incorruptible. The judge's forgetfulness, however, is
not the sort of objectively ascertainable fact that can avoid the appearance of
partiality. Under [the statute], therefore, recusal is required even when a judge
lacks actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or bias in the case if a
reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge
would have actual knowledge.58
Permitting substitution of another judge was the most effective method to
promote and maintain public confidence in the judicial system.
State courts too have written about the justification for the appearance of
partiality standard. The premise for the standard is that the appearance of fairness
is as important as fairness itself.59 "The legal system will endure only so long as
members of society continue to believe that our courts endeavor to provide

53. Id. at 825 (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57,60 (1972)).
54. The statute provides: "Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1999).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1999).
56. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
57. Id. at 860.
58. Id. at 860-61, quoting Health Services Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 R2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1986).
59. See, e.g., Ex parte Bryant, 682 So.2d 39,41 (Ala. 1996) ("appearance of fairness is virtually as important
as is fairness itself*); Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 384 (W. Va. 1995)
("avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as important... as avoiding impropriety itself); McElhanon v.
Hing, 728 P.2d 273,282 (Ariz. 1986) ("justice must not only be done fairly but... must be perceived as having
been done fairly"); Wells v. Walter, 501 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1973) (appearance of impropriety is next in
importance only to actual impropriety and cannot be sacrificed to convenience); Consiglio v. Consiglio, 711
A.2d 765, 768 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) ("appearance and the existence of impartiality are both essential elements
of a fair trial").
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untainted, unbiased forums in which justice may be found and done/' In order
to maintain a high level of public respect for the judiciary, the courts themselves
must conscientiously protect the right of every citizen to have the "cold neutrality
of an impartial judge."61
60. Tennant, 459 S.E.2d at 384. See Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862, 877-78 (N.D.
1993) (public respect and confidence "can only be maintained if justice satisfies the appearance of justice");
State ex rel. Corbin v. Superior Court, 748 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Ariz. 1987) ("system of justice depends for its
survival on the support and confidence of the public"); Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238, 247
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("vital to public confidence in the legal system that decisions of the court are not only fair,
but also appear fair"); State v. Laughlin, 508 N.W.2d 545,548 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (give litigants "no cause to
think their case is not being fairly judged").
61. Consligio v. Consligio, 711 A.2d 765, 768 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998), quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Parks,
194 So. 613 (Fla. 1939). To guarantee every litigant less than an impartial judge:
tends to discredit the judiciary and shadow the administration of justice. It is not enough for a judge to
assert that he is free from prejudice. His mien and the reflex from his courtroom speak louder than he
can declaim on this p o i n t . . . . The attitude of the judge and the atmosphere of the courtroom should
indeed be such that no matter what charge is lodged against a litigant or what cause he is called on to
litigate, he can approach the bar with every assurance that he is in a forum where the judicial ermine is
everything that it typifies, purity and justice.
Id. at 768-69.
Judicial independence may be another reason for state courts to apply an "appearance of partiality" rule in
addition to the specific examples in the state codes. In Consiglio, a trial judge removed himself from all cases
involving an attorney because the judge did not approve of the way the attorney handled himself. Despite the
understanding between the judge and the attorney about the meaning of the earlier ruling, several weeks later the
presiding judge for the jurisdiction assigned the trial judge to hear a case in which the attorney was counsel of
record. Reversing the judgment, the appellate court held that it "was inappropriate for the presiding judge to
instruct the trial judge to hear" the case.
The presiding judge does not have the power to tell a trial judge when he or she may or may not recuse
himself or herself. The matter of a judge's recusal in the reasonable discretion of that judge, and is not
to be overruled by a presiding judge. The decision to recuse oneself is an intrinsic part of the
independence of a judge. Any attempt to instruct or order a judge to hear a matter after recusal,
violates the independence of judges individually and the judiciary as a whole.
Id. at 769.
Another expression of concern about judicial independence and appearances was in Rogers v. Bradley, 909
S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1995). The plaintiffs in that medical malpractice case challenged four members of the Texas
Supreme Court because their election had been supported by the Texas Medical Association Political Action
Committee ("TEX-PAC"). One of the justices not then facing election recused himself because TEX-PAC had
tied its political efforts to the outcome of Rogers and at some time had endorsed or challenged every sitting
member of the court. That brought a stinging observation from one of the challenged justices:
[RJecusal would be required even though there is no questionable conduct on the part of the judge, but
solely because third parties tied their political efforts to the outcome of a particular case. While I
consider such third party activities to be troublesome, and I fear growing acceptance of this type of
campaigning bodes ill for the traditional notion of an independent judiciary, it cannot affect recusal. A
reasonable person would know that campaign supporters have motives for their support. But a
reasonable person cannot, without more, be justified in doubting the impartiality of the tribunal....
Under his reasoning, only judges who faced no election opposition would be able to fully perform the
functions of their office. Judges who defeated well-financed election opposition with strong
broad-based support would be virtually removed from the duties of the office to which they were
elected.
Id. at 883-84.
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B. JUDICIAL DISCLOSURE TO PARTIES AND COUNSEL
One peculiar aspect of both ABA Codes is the interplay between a judge's
knowledge about family, social and professional relationships, as well as
finances, and the duty to disclose to the parties any basis that may exist for
disqualification. Under the Codes, a judge must keep informed only about
personal and fiduciary finances and make a reasonable effort to stay apprised
about the personal finances of the judge's spouse and minor children living with
the judge.62 The ABA should modify the current standard to impose a mandatory
duty on judges to stay informed at least about any of the specific disqualifying
circumstances:
(2) A judge should keep informed about any circumstance which could lead to
disqualification, particularly the circumstances described in Canon 3E(l)(a)-(e)
[or Canon 3C(l)(a)-(e)].
The reason for using the aspirational "should" in this standard is that, unlike the
other standards, the judge's failure to inform himself or herself need not be the
basis for reversible error or even an ethical violation.
In states adopting the commentary to the 1990 Code, the judge "should"
disclose on the record any information that the parties "might" consider relevant
to disqualification issues, even if the judge believes that the information provides
no cause for recusal.63 The paradox* is that although the judge "should" disclose
any information that may be grounds for recusal, the judge has a duty to remain
knowledgeable about limited types of information. The current commentary
language regarding disclosure should be mandatory, be part of the black-letter
ethical standards, and follow the 1990 Code's Canon 3E(2) statement about a
judge's duty to remain informed:

62. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(2) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3C(2) cmt. (1972). See also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(c) (1990); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l)(c) (1972) (relating to disqualifying situations for economic interests in the
subject matter of a proceeding or a party to the proceeding).
63. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990). The 1972 Code is silent on the disclosure
issue. One court has characterized this provision as "a separate obligation . . . that is broader than the duty to
disqualify." In the Matter of Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 711 (Ind. 1998). See Inquiry Concerning Frank, 753
So.2d 1228, 1240 (Fla. 2000) (appellate judge should have disclosed to opposing counsel that his daughter's
divorce attorney was appearing as counsel in appellate case).
However, in United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 106-07
(1985), the appellate court used the trial judge's delay to support a judge who failed to disclose to the parties
until thirty-two days into the bench trial that his spouse had worked for one of the parties when the claim arose.
The objecting party seeking mandamus was unable to cite any judicial conduct by the judge that supported any
inference of partiality.
Even if disclosure if required, how much disclosure is necessary? Is the fact of disclosure or the nature of the
disclosure more important? Disclosure may be inappropriate or unnecessary when it would result in the parties
having information about a confidential proceeding involving the judge.
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A judge shall disclose on the record any information which the judge believes the
parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification,
even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification.
Even if a judge does convey pertinent information to the parties, the judge is
not automatically required to recuse when a motion is filed. The judge's
disclosure simply gives the parties the opportunity either to request that the judge
recuse or to agree in writing that the judge may nevertheless hear the dispute.6^ In
Kalapp v. State,65 after the judge made a pretrial disclosure that in private
practice he had represented the defendant's grandfather, he asked whether either
party intended to file a motion to disqualify. Neither party sought recusal. At
sentencing, the judge noted that in a small town he knows everyone, including
both families in the instant case. The appellate court upheld his refusal to recuse
himself sua sponte.
When a judge fails to disclose information to the parties that the judge knew or
should have known, this failure to disclose could provide the basis for a motion to
disqualify. However, the case law is split on this issue. Some cases suggest that an
appellate court should remand the case or vacate all orders entered by the judge who
failed to disclose a basis for disqualification.66 Other courts have concluded that failure
to make a timely disclosure either does not raise an appearance of partiality or renders
an ethical violation effectively harmless.67 For example, in State v. Mann,68 although
the trial judge did not disclose before a child kidnapping trial that he had been a victim
of child abuse, the appellate court held that the judge's experiences were "so attenuated
in time and so dissimilar in nature that no reasonable person... could conclude that the
judge would be perceived as being disqualified."69 In Tennant v. Marion Health Care
Foundation, Inc.,70 the appellate court set aside a successor trial judge's conclusion that
the plaintiffs "had an absolute right to be notified" about the original trial judge's
representation in his official capacity by one of the defense counsel and that appearance
of impropriety required a new trial. While the appellate court agreed that the original

64. See, e.g., Voeltz v. Morrell & Co., 564 N.W.2d 315, 319 (S.D. 1997) (no opportunity to waive
disqualification); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Berry, 669 So.2d 56, 75 (Miss. 1996) (judge should have
given parties an opportunity to object or consent to his sitting in case); Bride v. Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449, 455
(Iowa 1996) (no opportunity to request judge's recusal); State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994) (no
chance to make motion to disqualify or waive jury); Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390 (N.H.
1992) (lost opportunity to motion for recusal or waive conflict). See also State v. Alderson, 922 P.2d 435,441 -43
(Kan. 1996) (judge disclosed that stolen car in case belonged to his brother, but denied counsel's motion to
disqualify; no error in denial of motion).
65. Kalapp v. State, 729 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
66. See, e.g., Voeltz, 564 N.W.2d at 319 (reversal, in part because administrative law judge failed to disclose
that she was negotiating with defendant for employment while case was pending); Bride 556 N.W.2d at 455
(reversal, in part for failure to disclose judge's prior representation of defense counsel's law firm).
67. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
68. State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528 (Iowa 1994).
69. Id. at 533.
70. Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc, 459 S.E.2d 374,384 (W.Va. 1995).
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trial judge had called the judicial process into question, it held that the appearance of
impropriety or a "sense of unfairness" did not require a new trial,
C. PRESUMPTION OF IMPARTIALITY AND THE
REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
In reviewing a motion to recuse, the challenged judge is presumed to be
qualified and impartial, i.e., a "judge would not undertake to preside over a case
where his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned."71 "The law will
not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that
presumption and idea."72 As a result of this presumption of honesty and integrity,
a moving party has the burden of proving that the judge is unqualified, actually
biased and prejudiced, or appears to be partial.73 To avoid the appearance of
impropriety, the judge should be the first to raise the issue by recusing in a
particular case. If a judge recuses sua sponte, appellate courts assume that a
reasonable person would have doubts about the judge's impartiality, regardless of
whether the reviewing court itself would have recused on the same facts.74 On the
other hand, when a party seeks the trial judge's recusal for the appearance of
partiality, appellate decisions are divided about whether the judge's personal
views matter. Some decisions correctly conclude that the judge's subjective
beliefs matter only when actual bias and prejudice are alleged,75 rather than when
the record shows that a reasonable person would find an appearance of
partiality.76 Other decisions exhibit more deference to the trial judge, assuming
that he or she would have disqualified himself or herself if there had been any
reasonable question concerning his or her impartiality.77
71. Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238,246 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). See Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d
1144,1151 (Miss. 1998) (defendant failed to overcome presumption that judge was qualified and unbiased).
72. Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986), quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES.

73. See, e.g,, Turner v. State, 926 S.W.2d 843,847 (Ark. 1995); Wallace v. State, 741 So.2d 938,941 (Miss. Ct. App.
1999) (burden of proof on movant is beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Haskins, 573 N.W2d 39,44 (Iowa Ct. App,
1997) (movant's burden is "substantial"); Brown v. State, 663 So.2d 1028,1031 (Ala Crim. App. 1995) (same).
74. See Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 386 n.10 (W. Va. 1995); Jacobs v.
Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 416,417 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).
75. However, the trial judge's assurances of no prejudice are worthless when the record fails to support the
judge's finding of fact. See, e.g., Ellis v. Proctor and Gamble Dist, Co., 433 S.E.2d 856, 857 (S.C. 1993). See
also Sincavage v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 224, 230 (1996) ("doubt as to impartiality . .. arises when
judges changes her mind upon learning the very fact which she earlier said would disqualify her"); Perotti v.
State, 806 P.2d 325, 328-29 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (judge's initial offer to recuse "uniquely significant" to
finding appearance of partiality).
76. State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 917-18 (Mo. 1996). See Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 823 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1994) ("we do not question in the least the judge's intentions . . . or his determination from a
subjective, personal viewpoint that recusal was not necessary;" recusal deemed appropriate "to avoid public
appearance of partiality").
77. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171,178 (Mo. 1998) (judge "is in the best position to decide whether
recusal is necessary"); Linkage v. Trustees of Boston University, 679 N.E.2d 191,201 (Mass. 1997) ("judge also
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The standard used by most78 state courts to measure whether a judge's
impartiality might be questioned is objective79 rather than subjective. Several
reasons support rejection of the judge's subjective perspective.
Problematic is the fact that judges do not stand outside of the judicial system;
they are intimately involved in the process of obtaining justice. Judges who are

concluded that the case was not one in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned"); Lawson v.
State, 664 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (whether a circumstance had "any impact upon the judge's
impartiality . . . is a question only the trail judge can answer"). See also People v. T&C Design, Inc., 680
N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (1998) ("if a Judge is passing upon a question of his or her own recusal, then he or she is
creating an appearance of impropriety by that act alone"); Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions:
Who Judges the Judges?t2% VALP. L. REV. 543 (1994).
78. Some courts have ruled that the existence of an appearance of partiality is "a subjective determination ... only
the trial judge can answer." Lawson, 664 N.E.2d at 781. The question for the Lawson court was whether the particular
circumstance had any effect on the judge's impartiality. The court assumed, "absent any evidence to the contrary, that the
trial judge would have disqualified herself had there been any reasonable question concerning her impartiality." Id
Other courts also mistakenly view the judge's evaluation of the appearance of partiality as a two-step process. The
judge first determines whether he or she has a subjective bias, and, if not, whether objectively his or her impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Class, 524 N.W.2d 860, 863 (S.D. 1994); State v. Connors, 995
S.W.2d 146,149 (Term. Crim. App. 1998). Reliance on this analytical technique is misplaced. The case relied upon in
Mitcfiell correctly applied the two-step approach to the presence or absence of personal bias or prejudice. State v. Smith,
242 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1976). However, while a subjective component of a personal bias or prejudice analysis is proper,
see, e.g., Parenteau v. Jacobson, 586 N.E.2d 15 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), it is inappropriate in assessing whether a judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
79. Several state courts have cited excerpts from Judge Easterbrook's remarks from In Matter ofMason, 916
F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1990), about the dilemma posed by the availability of the objective "might reasonably be
questioned" language for evaluating a judge's ethics. See, e.g., Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, 717
A.2d 1232, 1237 (Conn. 1998); Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 882 (Tex. 1995); Robin Farms, Inc. v.
Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
An objective standard is essential when the question is how things appear to the well-informed,
thoughtful observer rather than to a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person. Because some people
see goblins behind every tree, a subjective approach would approximate automatic disqualification. A
reasonable observer is unconcerned about trivial risks; there is always some risk, a probability
exceeding 0.0001%, that a judge will disregard the merits. Trivial risks are endemic, and if they were
enough to require disqualification we would have a system of peremptory strikes and judge-shopping,
that itself would imperil the perceived ability of the judicial system to decide cases without regard to
persons. A thoughtful observer understands that putting disqualification in the hands of a party, whose
real fear may be that the judge will apply rather than disregard the law, could introduce a bias into
adjudication. Thus the search is for arisksubstantially out of the ordinary.
An objective standard creates problems in implementation. Judges must imagine how a reasonable,
well-informed observer of the judicial system would react. Yet the judge does not stand outside the
system; as a dispenser rather than a recipient or observer of decisions, the judge understands how
professional standards and the desire to preserve one's reputation often enforce the obligation to
administer justice impartially, even when an observer might be suspicious. Judges asked to recuse
themselves hesitate to impugn their own standards; judges sitting in review of others do not like to
cast aspersions. Yet drawing all inferences favorable to the honesty and care of the judge whose
conduct has been questioned could collapse the appearance of impropriety standard under
§455(a) into a demand for proof of actual impropriety. So although the court tries to make an external
reference to the reasonable person, it is essential to hold in mind that these outside observers are less
inclined to credit judges' impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary itself will be.
In Matter of Mason, 916 F.2d at 386 (emphasis in original).
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asked to recuse themselves are reluctant to impugn their own standards.
Likewise, judges sitting in review of others doriotlike to cast aspersions. Yet
drawing all inferences favorable to the honesty and care of the judge whose
conduct has been questioned could collapse the appearance of impropriety
standard into a demand for proof of actual impropriety. Accordingly, we are
mindful that an observer of our judicial system is less likely to credit judges'
impartiality than the judiciary.80
Assessing judicial impartiality from the subjective position of the moving party
also is defective.81 The adversary seeking recusal is already questioning the
judge's impartiality, and the opponent likely will oppose the motion by arguing
that no such appearance is present.
Instead of asking whether the judge personally doubts his or her own partiality,
courts look at the facts and circumstances known to the judge or brought to the
judge's attention: would a reasonable person knowing all the facts conclude that
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned? When it is plausible for
a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality, it is then appropriate for
a party or counsel to challenge the judge's impartiality by motion.
The 1972 ABA Code Reporter's standard for evaluating the appearance of
impartiality was "any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all
the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned."82 Despite that guidance, state courts have adopted numerous

80. Tennamt v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc. 459 S.E.2d 374, 386 n-. 9 (W. Va. 1995), quoting United
States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1995).
Even a judge's statement that a person could reasonably question his impartiality may be ignored by an
appellate court. See State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 533 n.l (Iowa 1994) (judge's response did not concede an
ethical violation because judge stated in deposition that he gave his prior experiences as abuse victim no thought
as he approached trial of child kidnapping).
81. See State v. Logan, 689 P.2d 778, 784 (Kan. 1984) (neither the judge, the defendant, or his attorney
should determine whether the judge's objectivity would be questioned); United Farm Workers of America,
AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 106 n.6 (1985) ("the partisan litigant emotionally involved in
the controversy underlying the lawsuit is not the disinterested objective observer whose doubts concerning the
judge's impartiality provide the governing standard").
82. E. Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct, A.B.A. 60-61 (1973). Connecticut and Ohio
have adopted this standard. See Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Conn.1998);
James v. James, 656 N.E.2d 399,404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
Other states use Thode's standard in similar language. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 974 P.2d 11, 20 (Haw. 1999)
("assessment of a reasonable impartial onlooker apprised of all the facts"); Bride v. Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449,
455 (Iowa 1996) ("whether a reasonable person would question the judge's impartiality"); In re Edwards, 694
N.E.2d 701, 710 (Ind. 1998) ("whether an objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would
have a reasonable basis for doubting"); In re Cooks, 694 So.2d 892, 903 (La. 1997) ("any reasonable judge,
faced with such circumstances, would have recused"); Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d 1144, 1152 (Miss. 1998)
("whether a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts"); State v. Jones, 979
S.W.2d 171, 178 (Mo. 1999) ("whether a reasonable person would have a factual basis to find an appearance of
impropriety and thereby doubt the impartiality of the court."); Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d
238, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("existence of an appearance of impropriety . . . is based on the perception of a
member of the general public, not one trained in the law"); Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390
(N.H. 1992) ("would a reasonable person, not the judge himself, question the impartiality of the court"). In
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variations. The reasonable person is sometimes characterized as a "reasonable
disinterested observer,"83 a person of reasonable or ordinary prudence,84 a
"reasonably prudent and disinterested person,"85 or a "well-informed, thoughtful
and objective observer."86 Some decisions require that the reasonable person
know all the facts in the public domain,87 or know the relevant facts and
understand them.88 Despite the differences in defining the reasonable person
standard, the states' uniform approach toward the general principle mitigates the
need to include it in the ABA Code,
D. JUDICIAL REMEDY OR HARMLESS ERROR FOR ETHICAL VIOLATIONS
After deciding that an appearance of partiality violation has occurred, the court
must determine whether a remedy is proper or whether to apply a harmless error
analysis.89 If the appearance of partiality provides the only basis for reversal, one
set of cases suggests vacating all orders entered by the now-disqualified judge as

Kentucky, the judicial reference is to "an objective observer." Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879,
882 (Ky. 1992).
83. Ball v. Melsur Corporation, 633 A.2d 705, 709 (Vt. 1993).
84. Goines v. State, 708 So.2d 656,659 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810,823 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1994); Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
85. State v. Carlson, 833 P.2d 463,468 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis supplied).
86. Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc. 459 S.E.2d 374, 386 (W. Va. 1995), quoting United
States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995).
87. Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 881 (Tex. 1995)
88. See State v. Putnam, 675 A?2d 422,425 (Vt. 1996); Chapman v. State, 694 A.2d 480,483 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1997).
89. Complaints of ethical violations also can arise in the context of a judicial disciplinary proceeding.
Typically, a case is heard by the state's highest court when a judicial conduct entity recommends a disciplinary
sanction after finding an ethical violation. In re Cooks, 694 So.2d 892 (La. 1997), concerned a judge who was
charged with failing to recuse when her own attorney was also representing a party in a case pending before the
judge, and she had a close personal relationship with another litigant. After finding that the appearance of bias
and prejudice were "overwhelming," the Louisiana Supreme Court enumerated a list of relevant factors for an
appropriate sanction:
(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of conduct; (b) the nature,
extent and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in
or out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's official capacity or in his
private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f) whether
the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his conduct; (g) the length of service on the
bench; (h) whether there have been prior complaints about this judge; (i) the effect the misconduct has
upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and (j) the extent to which the judge exploited his
position to satisfy his personal desires.
In re Cooks, 694 So.2d at 904. The court found that the aggravating factors were that: (1) the misconduct
occurred in the judge's official capacity; (2) it had detrimentally affected respect for the judiciary; and (3) it
created the appearance that she used her position to help obtain a favorable ruling for her friend. Mitigating
factors identified by the court were that this was an isolated instance of a failure to recuse, the judge stipulated
that the conduct occurred, she had been a judge for only a short time, and that she had received no prior
disciplinary sanctions. Id. at n.16. Of the possible sanctions of removal, suspension, public censure, and private
reprimand, the court concluded that public censure, as recommended by the Judiciary Commission, was proper.
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well as any subsequent orders that were based upon the earlier, "tainted"
rulings.90
A second group of cases incorrectly upholds denial of a disqualification motion
when the jury is the fact finder and actually decides the case, because the
"integrity of the fact-finding process is insulated from any predispositions held
by the trial judge" who properly submitted the case to the jury.91 Arguably, with a
jury trial, the judge's evidentiary rulings and other matters of law are part of the
record and are reviewable for any instances of actual bias.92 The better view is
that a jury trial is no substitute for granting a motion to recuse.93 During a jury
trial, a judge still exercises discretion about various matters and makes decisions
that may influence the verdict returned by the jury.94
Canon 3[ ] of the Judicial Code applies to every judge in every case; it does not
set a lower standard for a judge sitting without a jury than for a judge sitting
with a jury, but a single standard . . . . [T]he argument implies that where the
judge is not the trier-of-fact, his role is somewhat less than decisive to the
outcome of the proceeding.95
A third set of cases suggests that a violation of the appearance of partiality
standard does not automatically require a new trial or a reversal without
additional proof confirming actual bias or prejudice.96 Actual prejudice is "shown
when there exists a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been more

90. See, e.g., Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 391 (N.H. 1992) (all orders traceable to
disqualified judge vacated); State v. Smith, 635 So.2d 512, 515 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (sentencing of defendant by
judge, who while a practitioner had stood in for counsel of record at arraignment, vacated). Cf. State ex rel.
Thexton v. Killebrew, 25 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (judge's order setting aside his selfdisqualification is void).
See also Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1238 (Conn. 1998) (where the court
found that the judge's improper denial of a motion for disqualification also indicated that the trial court had
improperly denied a motion for a mistrial, and thus the appellate court remanded the case for a new trial).
91. Commonwealth v. Mercado, 649 A.2d 946,960-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). Similarly, in Chapman v. State,
694 A.2d 480, 482 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997), the trial judge offered to recuse if the defendant wanted a jury,
stating that with a jury all he had to do was to rule on motions and give jury instructions. After giving defense
counsel a chance to argue whether recusal was appropriate in a jury trial, the judge denied the motion when
defense counsel replied in the negative. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion.
92. See Reems v. St. Joseph's Hosp. and Health Center, 536 N.W.2d 666,671 (N.D. 1995).
93. In Parenteau v. Jacobson, 586 N.E.2d 15, 18-19 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), the court suggested that a court's
ruling on a motion to disqualify is irrelevant to when the trial might begin, given the need to find a different
judge if the motion was granted.
94. See Parenteau, 586 N.E.2d at 19 (vacating the judgment and remanding for new trial).
95. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 479 A.2d 973, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984). In other cases, the reviewing court has found that some aspect of the proceeding precludes a reversal,
despite the appearance of partiality. See, e.g.. Commonwealth v. Sharp, 683 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996) (sheriff successfully sought and obtained search warrant from his judge-spouse; reviewing court refused
to find that the appearance required "negation" of the warrant's validity, because the issuance of a warrant is
subject to at least two levels of review).
96. See, e.g., State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998); Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation,
Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374,386 (W. Va. 1995).
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favorable for the [losing party] absent the trial judge's appearance of bias."97 The
United States Supreme Court contributed significantly to the judicial reluctance
to prescribe remedies each time an appearance of partiality occurs when it stated
that "there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who
inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance."98
In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corporation?9 the Supreme Court
held that a federal judge who was a university trustee should have recused
himself from a proceeding in which the university had an interest. After
identifying the ethical violation, the Court concentrated on whether the breach
required that the judgment be vacated, or whether an erroneous denial of a motion
to disqualify may be harmless.
[I]n determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a[n ethical]
violation... it is appropriate to consider theriskof injustice to the parties in the
particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other
cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial
process. We must continuously bear in mind that to perform its high function in
the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." l0°
Because the factors for appearance of partiality cases are more rigorous than
typical harmless error analysis, they do not limit a court to a finding of actual
prejudice in order to reverse.101

97. 4/0/120, 973 P.2d at 979.
98. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862 (1988).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 864, quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The Liljeberg Court applied its own
standards to the facts summarily and concluded that: (1) a greater risk of unfairness existed if it upheld the
judgment instead of having a different judge take a "fresh look" at the issues; neither party had shown special
hardship by relying on the judgment; and (2) the delay was attributable to the trial judge's failure to recuse
himself sua sponte. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. at 868-69.
101. Courts have applied these principles to ex parte judicial conversations. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(7)(a) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(4) (1972). In In re WT.L,
656 A.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the judge initiated an ex parte conversation with another juvenile about the
juvenile defendant during an unrelated court proceeding involving the other juvenile. The appellate court ruled
that the ethical violation was harmless. In Foster v. United States, 615 A.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1992), although the
judge conducted an ex parte communication with the parole board regarding its sentencing recommendation in
violation of Canon 3(A)(4), the appellate court found the error harmless. In both cases, the court examined the
Liljeberg factors after making afindingof an ethical violation. The courts* respective adoption of a harmless
error analysis is as instructive for what would constitute reversible- error, as it is for why both cases ruled the
error to be harmless. As to the risk of injustice to the parties, the W.T.L. court stated that the risk is "negligible"
when the communication elicits no prejudicial information about the party and arises in a proceeding in which
the court considers a variety of sources of information in making its discretionary decision. In re W.T.L, 656
A.2d at 1130. In Foster, the court downplayed the risk of injustice to the defendant when the relevant
proceeding contains a highly discretionary issue. Foster, 615 A.2d at 220. Both appellate decisions evaluated
the risk of injustice to others by relying on their prior admonitions to trial judges to avoid such ex parte
communications. In re W.T.L, 656 A.2d at 1130; Foster, 615 A.2d at 221. Foster weakly noted that its facts
differed from prior decisions in which the court already had scolded trial judges, and recommended that any
future conversations occur on the record and in the presence of counsel. Foster, 615 A.2d at 221. The risk of
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EXAMPLES OF THE APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY

A. JUDICIAL REMARKS AND EXTRAJUDICIAL SOURCE RULE
The appearance of impropriety may emanate from judicial conduct or remarks
directed at counsel, her client, a witness, or an issue102 in a proceeding. The case
law resolves this type of disqualification motion as either a personal bias or
prejudice103 issue or as an appearance of impropriety issue. Because of counsel's
actions in the current or a prior case, the judge may question his or her own
fairness to counsel's client.104 Or, the judge's reaction to a motion to disqualify
may constitute the appearance itself. In Williams v. Reed,105 counsel in a child
custody and support case moved for the judge's recusal because the judge was
about to become involved in a dissolution proceeding in which the judge's spouse
was involved in a same-sex relationship and child custody would be an issue.
Prior to the hearing on the motion, the judge questioned counsel about the source

undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process again was dismissed as "insignificant" in the
absence of evidence of judicial bias or prejudice to the defendants. In re W.T.L, 656 A.2d at 1130; Foster, 615
A.2dat222.
By contrast, State v. Salazar held that disqualification was required due to the appearance of partiality,
thereby rejecting the harmless error analysis in a case where counsel for one of the parties began to represent the
judge's former secretary in a wrongful termination claim against the judge. 898 P.2d 982 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
The reviewing court focused on the risk of injustice to the parties, finding that the judge had made several
important rulings against the defendant one of which the court had already found to constitute reversible error.
The court noted that the trial judge should not sit in any cases involving counsel as long as the secretary's claim
progressed.
See also Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1237 (Conn. 1998) (case remanded for
new trial due to appearance of partiality; in easement matter judge made ex parte visit to property that was
subject of dispute and engaged in conversation with resident); Tyson v. State, 622 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ind. 1993)
(appellate judge's spouse's conversation with appellate counsel created appearance of partiality, requiring
judge's recusal).
102. See, e.g., State ex rel. McCulloch v. Drumm, 984 S.W.2d 555, 557-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (judge
indicated to parties that he had made up mind about validity of defense prior to retrial; appearance of
impropriety); State v. Ray, 984 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (judge's oral and written statements
suggested that he was interested in fact-finding mission; appearance of bias against prosecution); Jefferson-El v.
State, 622 A.2d 737, 743 (Md. 1993) (judge criticized jury verdict, issued warrant for defendant's revocation,
and made remarks preliminary to start of revocation proceedings showed appearance of impropriety); State ex
rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692,698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (judge told parties that his own divorce case's
disposition of marital property was an alternative he might consider if case went to trial; remanded for
evidentiary hearing on appearances).
103. See, e.g., Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d 1144, 1151 (Miss. 1998); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 324
(Iowa 1976); Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Services, Inc., 467 N.E.2d 222,225 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
104. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 727 A.2d 254,256 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999), where the court recused itself from all
of counsel's cases because the judge did not approve of the way counsel "handled" himself. When the presiding
judge ordered the trial judge to preside over one of counsel's cases, the appellate court reversed and remanded
due to the appearance of partiality stemming from the judge's initial remarks and the subsequent unfairness of
having a judge who had made such an admission nevertheless preside in counsel's case.
See also Vaska v. State, 955 P.2d 943,946-7 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (case remanded for proof about whether
the trial judge's law clerk engaged in conduct creating an appearance of partiality by revealing confidential
memo to prosecutor).
105. Williams v. Reed, 6 S.W.3d 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2000]

THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

. 77

of and factual basis for the motion. The judge called counsel's client to the
witness stand, denied her request to consult with her counsel, and threatened to
hold her in contempt if she failed to follow his orders. Prior to denying the
motion, the judge told counsel that he was personally insulted by thefilingof
such a baseless motion. In addition to finding that the judge should have recused
because he effectively made his spouse a material witness,106 the court assessed
whether the appearance of partiality also required recusal and constituted
reversible error. The context of the record showed that:
the trial judge went beyond merely possessing the view that the allegation was
offensive, and he went beyond expressing his displeasure at the making of the
allegation . . . . The feelings of personal insult the judge understandably
possessed appear to have affected the way in which he conducted the hearing
. . . to such a degree that a reasonable person would doubt the judge's
impartiality.107
Judicial frustration with a matter can lead to an appearance of partiality,
perhaps depending on when the judge chooses to speak. In Cameron v.
Cameron™* for example, the appellate court criticized the trial judge for
expressing a preconceived view of a witness's credibility. The judge on several
occasions stated that the defendant or counsel was attempting to perpetrate a
fraud on the court and that the defendant had lied under oath in an earlier
deposition. When the judge invited the defendant to testify, the judge held him in
contempt after he gave his name and address. By contrast, after conclusion of the
matter, reviewing courts are much more lenient about what a judge can say to a
party without risking even an appearance problem. Neither an explanation for a
particular sentence to protect society from people like the defendant nor a judicial
admonition not to appear in the judge's courtroom again necessitates recusal.109
The appearance of impropriety may require recusal when a judge's remarks
about the parties or a litigation issue results from information discovered outside
the judicial proceeding,110 because that opinion arises from an extrajudicial

106. Id. at 921. See Mo. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 3D(l)(d)(iii) (1999) (requires disqualification when the

judge knows that the judged spouse is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding).
107. W///am5, 6 S.W.3d at 923.
108. Cameron v. Cameron, 444 A.2d 915, 918-19 (Conn. 1982). In State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 980 (Utah
1998), the appellate court concluded that there was an appearance of partiality when the trial judge told the
defendants that their case could be resolved quickly if they would simply waive their right to a jury trial and
"just plead guilty." The appellate court ruled, however, that the appearance of partiality without a showing of
bias was not reversible error.
109. See, e.g., People v. Dumas, 739 A.2d 1251, 1260 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (defendant failed to show that
judicial description of him as a marauder following sentencing showed appearance of impropriety); People v.
Cline, 596 N.Y.S.2d 925,927 (App. 1993) (remarks that defendant should not appear before judge again years
earlier does not preclude judge from sitting in current case).
110. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994) (extrajudicial source doctrine applicable to
appearance of partiality standard).
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source. A judge's opinion based upon information heard during a current or even
an earlier proceeding does not stem from an extrajudicial source and is generally
not considered to be grounds for disqualification.111 Not all cases fit the general
rule. In Jefferson-El v. State,112 following defendant's acquittal, the trial court on
the record criticized the jury's decision as an "abomination" and the next day
issued a warrant charging defendant with a probation violation. While there is not
actual impropriety in the same judge hearing the probation revocation after
presiding at the trial which resulted in the probation violation, it appeared from
the judge's remarks that the "judge believed either that the [defendant]
committed perjury or otherwise 'hoodwinked' the jury, escaping all punishment
for the crime the judge believed he committed."113 To a reasonable person, the
judge's remarks suggested that he was predisposed to revoke the defendant's
probation whatever the circumstances.114

HI. See Duncan v. State, 638 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Ala. 1994); State v. D'Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909, 913
(Ohio 1993); City of Kansas City v. Willis, 697 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Dane
Entertainment Services, Inc., 467 N.E.2d 222,225 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
112. Jefferson-El v. State, 622 A.2d 737 (Md. 1993).
113. Id. at 742. See Ireland v. Smith, 542 N.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (after holding that trial
judge committed reversible error in child custody dispute, he was disqualified from hearing on remand due to
appearance of partiality; his remarks to media were inconsistent with hisfindingsof fact and the appellate court
perceived that it would be unreasonable for the judge to put his prior expressed views out of his mind).
114. In State v. Emanuel, 768 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), following the defendant's theft conviction but
prior to sentencing, the judge conducted an ex parte inquiry into the defendant's background. At the sentencing
hearing, the judge stated that he had conducted the inquiry because the presentence report revealed nothing
about why the defendant had left the employ of several attorneys. From his inquiry, he learned that the attorneys
believed that the defendant had stolen from them. The judge noted on the record that he was not basing the
sentence on what he had learned from the attorneys. The appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded the
case for resentencing before another judge due to the appearance of partiality.
In Emanuel, the court relied upon two cases in which the judge had ex parte contact with murder victims'
family members prior to sentencing and had received unrebutted information pertaining to the issues before the
court. See Id. at 198, citing State v. Leslie, 666 P.2d 1072 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Valencia, 602 P.2d 807 (Ariz.
1979).
The Emanuel court also noted III American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice 18-6.9, Judicial
Restraint (2d ed. 1980):
Although the sentencing court may appropriately take into consideration the defendant's admission of
guilt or assistance given the prosecution in come circumstances, it is inappropriate for the court to
take the initiative in seeking to obtain such a confession or to induce cooperation with the prosecution.
Similarly, although it is desirable that the sentencing court request the parties and the probation officer
to provide it with additional information where the sentencing record appears incomplete or
potentially inaccurate, the court should not undertake its own investigation absent extraordinary
circumstances or otherwise consider allegations of misconduct by the defendant not present in the
sentencing record.
Mat 201.
By contrast, when a judge holds an ex parte communication with someone who is not a party or a witness to
the events at issue and the conversation concerns a piece of property that is not at issue, a reasonable person
would not find that the conversation created an appearance of partiality. See TSA International Ltd. v. Shimizu
Corp., 990 P.2d 713,725 (Haw. 1999).
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The commentary to the Code should be amended to reflect the following about
judicial remarks:
When an allegation is made that a judge's remarks require disqualification or
discipline, the following are some of the factors which should be evaluated: (1)
the content and timing of the remarks; (2) whether the remarks indicate
prejudgment of a party, lawyer, witness, or an issue in the proceeding; (3)
whether the remarks were made on the record during a proceeding; (4) whether
the media published the remarks; and (5) whether the remarks were consistent
with rulings made by the judge as part of the proceedings.
The content of judicial remarks can indicate a harshness or kindness toward the
listener that suggests at a minimum the appearance of partiality (rather than
personal bias or prejudice). The timing of the remarks may establish whether the
judge appears to have prejudged a person or issue, or whether the proceeding is
complete. Finally, the ease or difficulty of proving an appearance of partiality
may be affected by whether the remarks are part of an audio, video, or written
record. A dispute about whether the judge in fact made a comment can obscure
the issue of whether the statement if made constituted the appearance of
partiality.
B. PRESIDING OVER A PRIOR RELATED OR UNRELATED CASE
As discussed, the extrajudicial source rule generally prevents disqualification
when the judge has acquired information about a matter or a person.115 The
appearance of partiality may arise not only when the judge presides over the same
or a related case involving the same party,116 but even when the judge previously
sat in unrelated proceedings. For example, in Pride v. Harris,111 the plaintiff in a

115. The person about whom information is gathered does not have to be a party in either proceeding. For
example, in State v. D'Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ohio 1993), a trial judge did not have to recuse himself
from hearing a case that led to a murder conviction. One of the important prosecution witnesses leading to that
conviction was also a witness who had testified at the co-defendant's trial over which the trial judge presided.
The reviewing court found that even if the trial judge had formed an opinion of the witness's veracity based on
the testimony at the first trial, that opinion did not disqualify the judge from presiding at the second trial.
However, some cases hold that, if the record shows that the judge in a prior proceeding expressed an opinion
about the facts in a later proceeding, recusal is necessary due to the judge's bias toward the defendant. See, e.g.,
People v. Gibson, 282 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Robinson, 310 N.E.2d 652 (111. 1974); In re
George G., 494 A.2d 247 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
116. In sparsely populated areas with only one judge, a local defendant may believe that an appearance of
partiality exists when he has been convicted, placed on probation, and now faces new charges as well as a
revocation proceeding before the same judge. Courts reject the argument that an appearance of partiality
requires disqualification from the second trial because the possibility of a future revocation proceeding
somehow will affect the judge's rulings during the current trial. See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 694 A.2d 480, 484
(Md.Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
117. Pride v. Harris, 882 R2d 381, 385 (Alaska 1994). See James v. People, 727 P.2d 850, 857 (Colo. 1986)
(two weeks before defendant's criminal trial, judge had made findings in woman's custody case that defendant
supplied drugs to her; no appearance of impropriety for judge to preside at defendant's sexual abuse trial
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personal injury action unsuccessfully sought disqualification of the judge who
had presided over plaintiff's child custody matter. Although the judge made
negative findings about plaintiff's fitness as a parent, the court held that no
appearance of partiality existed and noted that an unhappy litigant cannot remove
a judge due to unfavorable rulings.
Knowledge about a pending118 or past119 related proceeding usually does
not prevent a judge from being impartial, primarily because of the presumption of impartiality. One exception occurred in Perotti v. State,120 where the
defendant's criminal case was assigned to the same judge who had presided
over his juvenile waiver hearing. The appellate court held that an appearance
of partiality prevented the trial judge from sentencing the defendant for
murder. As in the juvenile hearing, the judge had relied upon erroneously
compelled evidence, both to order him treated as an adult and to sentence him
as an adult. The similarity of issues and the likelihood that the juvenile
proceeding evidence was inadmissible in the adult case were persuasive that a
fair-minded person would perceive an appearance of partiality for the judge to
sentence the defendant.
Despite the extrajudicial source rule, a judge should not sit in review of his or
her own decision, even in the same matter. That principle, which promotes an
effective, original evaluation of legal issues, is subject to two troubling
exceptions which, grounded in the extrajudicial source rule, effectively consume
it. First, courts recognize no appearance of partiality when judges determine the
legal validity of an earlier arrest or search warrant issued or authorized by him or
her.121 The rationale for this exception is twofold: (1) the judge obtained
knowledge about the facts supportive of the warrant's issuance from prior
proceedings in the same matter;122 and (2) in issuing the warrant the judge

involving different woman; judge's findings in custody case did not reflect disposition or prejudgment of
defendant's case). Arguably, the result should differ when the priorfindingrelated to a person's-credibility. The
judge's view about the person's veracity directly expresses an opinion about the party, even though the judge's
information was acquired in a judicial proceeding. If much time has passed since the judge's expression, the
judge may not recall it when the person from a past proceeding appears again in the judge's coun. For the person
to remind the judge of the ruling by raising the issue in order to disqualify the judge may amount to seeking the
judge's disfavor in order to obtain the judge's disqualification.
118. See Farren v. Commonwealth, 516 S.E.2d 253, 256 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) O^dge knew of defendant's
pending unreasonable refusal charge before trying DU1 charge; insufficient reason for recusal).
119. See People v. Burch, 530 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (1988) (knowledge from joint pretrial proceedings and
jury trial of accomplice does not create appearance of impropriety and recusal for defendant's bench trial);
State v. Hoeber, 737 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (judge knew of prior DUI guilty plea when
scheduled to hear probation revocation following additional DUI conviction; no plain error to refuse
recusal).
120. Perotti v. State, 806 P.2d 325, 329 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
121. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 741 So.2d 938, 942 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). See also People v. McCann, 626
N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1995); Bussell v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Ky. 1994); Stokes v. State, 853 S.W.2d
227,242 (Tex. Ct, App. 1993).
122. See Gentry v. State, 886 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994).
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decides merely whether the affidavit's information is sufficient for probable
cause, without vouching for its veracity.123
The second exception occurs when the judge is unaware that he or she is in fact
reviewing a prior matter, especially if the nature of the later decision making
involves none of the judge's rulings from the earlier proceeding. In Poorman v.
Commonwealth,124 for example, although an appellate judge had presided at the
defendant's probable cause and pretrial release hearings, counsel's failure to raise
the issue until after the appellate oral argument and the fact that none of the
judge's earlier rulings were being appealed produced a finding of no appearance
of partiality.
From the prior discussion, the Code commentary should be amended as
follows:
When an allegation is made that a judge is presiding over a prior related or
unrelated case, as to require disqualification or discipline, some of the factors to
be evaluated include: (1) the similarity of parties, witnesses, and issues in the
proceedings; (2) whether rulings on similar issues from the prior case have
been adjudged to be erroneous; (3) the amount of time between the prior
proceeding and the instant case; and (4) whether the judge is reviewing the
correctness of his or her own ruling, such as the correctness of the issuance of a
search warrant, and, if so, whether the judge is aware that he or she is reviewing
an earlier ruling.
C. PRESIDING OVER CASE OF FORMER CLIENT OR
FORMER CLIENT'S OPPONENT

Can a judge preside over a former client's,125 or former client's opponent's,
unrelated case, without raising the appearance of partiality? In criminal cases,
courts generally refuse to find an appearance of partiality when a judge, while
serving as a prosecuting attorney, had prosecuted the current defendant on an
unrelated charge.126 The relevant analytical elements are whether there is a

123. See State v. Monserrate, 479 S.E.2d 494, 501 (N.C.Ct.App. 1997).
124. Poorman v. Commonwealth, 782 S.W.2d 603, 606 (Ky. 1989).
125. The judge must be presiding over a former client's case. If the judge did not represent the person in the
past, the problem does not arise. In Wall v. State, 573 N.E.2d 890, 894 (Ind. 1991), the homicide victim had
consulted the judge-then-attorney about the theft of his vehicles. While advising him to contact his insurance
carrier, the judge maintained that he did not represent him. The judge did not file any lawsuit on the man's
behalf, never entered an appearance, never was paid, and did not send a bill. Based on the judge's statements in
denying the motion to disqualify, the appellate court found no appearance of partiality.
126. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 926 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Ark. 1996); Mitchell v. Class, 524 N.W.2d 860, 863
(S.D. 1994); State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988); Commonwealth v. Danish, 459 A.2d 727,
730-31 (Pa. 1983).
See I I I . SUP. CT. R. 63c(l)(c) (automatically disqualifies for seven years a judge who represented a current
party).
In State v. Dominguez, 914 P.2d 141, 144 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), the court found no appearance of unfairness
when the trial judge had both prosecuted the defendant in an unrelated case and defended him in another.
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relationship127 between the two proceedings, the amount of time between the past
prosecution and the instant case,128 and whether the past prosecution is relevant
to the current case.129
When the earlier case is civil in nature, additional factors become relevant.
Besides the recency of the representation and the similarities of the cases, courts
also look at the period of time and the number of cases in which the judge
represented the person, as well as the compensation received by the now-judge
for the representation. In Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholomew the judge
represented one of the current parties in three separate cases as an estate
representative four years before the current claim, and was compensated from
estate funds. While the reviewing court found no abuse of discretion in denying
the motion to recuse, "out of an abundance of caution it may have been better for
the judge here to have recused."131
Two Mississippi cases illustrate the appearance issue for civil litigators who
become judges. The trial judge presided over several medical malpractice cases
against a hospital for which he had served as general counsellor four years. In
each of the cases, plaintiff's counsel and the primary plaintiff's expert were the
same. The judge represented the hospital at a time when the hospital vigorously
recruited one of the defendants. During the hearing on the motion to recuse,
several exchanges between the judge and plaintiff's counsel reflected "great
personal tension," which grew out of a previous case during which counsel had
accused the judge of being racially biased. While the trial judge refused to recuse

127. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
128. Compare Turner, 926 S.W.2d at 847 (more than ten years); Mitchell, 524 N.W.2d at 862-63 (fifteen
years); Neeley, 748 R2d at 1093 (twenty years) with Goines v. State, 708 So.2d 656, 659 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (nearly six years; reversed due to error on disqualification issue); W.L v. State, 696 So.2d 457 (Ba. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (about two years; disqualification ordered).
129. Goines grafted an exception to the general rule. The appellate court granted a new trial for selling
cocaine, because the trial judge had previously prosecuted the defendant in an unrelated drug case. The state had
declared its intention to seek an enhanced sentence from the judge based upon consideration of "the facts and
circumstances surrounding the previous conviction [the judge] had helped to obtain." Goines, 708 So.2d at
659-60. Compare Cooper v. State, 879 S.W.2d 405 (Ark. 1994) (no bias or prejudice in having prosecutor who
obtained two convictions preside at trial where the two convictions would be used for enhancement).
130. Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). In Edwards v. State, 694 N.E.2d
701, 711 (Ind. 1998), the court listed relevant factors for determining whether a reasonable person would doubt
the judge's partiality: the nature of the prior representation, the duration of the attorney-client relationship, the
extent to which the prior representation might in some limited way be related to the current case, and the lapse of
time between the prior representation and the appearance of the former client before the judge. The Edwards
court applied these factors to three former clients. In each case the prior representation was in a proceeding
completely unrelated to the case over which the judge presided. The judge presided in the cases one tofiveyears
after representing the parties as clients.
131. Robin Farms, 989 S.W.2d at 250. See Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986) (reviewing
court found no abuse of discretion in trial judge's denial of recusal motion when judge ten years earlier as
county attorney had represented current party in two "routine" URESA proceedings); Chastain v. State, 521
S.E.2d 657, 661 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (no appearance of partiality because judge or her firm had represented
current trial witness in her divorce from defendant).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-i/i ri~~

T

T^,i

T7+-v,ir.o «9

9nnn-9nm

2000]

THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

83

himself on the ground of inconvenience to the parties, the appellate court found
an appearance of partiality, noting that inconvenience is an insufficient reason for
failing to disqualify.132
The foregoing discussion supports amendment of the Code commentary, as
follows:
When an allegation is made that a judge is presiding over the case of a prior
client (or the case of a person who was the former client's adversary at the time
of the representation) as to require disqualification or discipline, some of the
factors to be evaluated include: (1) the relationship between the two proceedings; (2) the amount of time between the past proceeding and the instant case;
(3) whether the past proceeding is relevant to the current case; (4) the number
of cases in which the judge represented the former client; and (5) the
compensation received by the judge for the prior representation.
D. PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ATTORNEYS, OTHER JUDGES,
AND ORGANIZATIONS
Because of a specific Code provision, a judge cannot hear a case handled
personally by the judge133 or by the judge's former legal associate during their
association.134 Moreover, the general appearance of impropriety standard is used

132. Collins v. Joshi, 611 So.2d 898 (Miss. 1992); Davis v. Neshoba County General Hosp., 611 So.2d 904
(Miss. 1992).
133. See Rushing v. City of Georgiana, 361 So.2d 11, 12 (Ala. 1978) (prosecutor on homicide charge was
sitting as judge in personal injury case arising from same transaction; disqualification required); State v. Smith,
635 So.2d 512, 515 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (judge represented defendant at arraignment; appearance of partiality;
remanded for resentencing by different judge).
134. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(b) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3(C)(1)(b) (1972).
The commentary states that although a lawyer in a governmental agency does not ordinarily have an
association with other lawyers employed by that agency within the meaning of these sections, a judge should
recuse if his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)
cmt. (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) cmt. (1972). See, e.g., State ex rel. Corbin v.
Superior Court, 748 R2d 1184,1186 (Ariz. 1987) (appearance of partiality requires resentencing of defendant in
case where judge was fellow prosecutor or prosecutor of record at time prosecution commenced); Small v.
Commonwealth, 617 S.W.2d 61, 62-3 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (as prosecutor, judge participated in plea bargaining
of defendant's original sentence; disqualification required revocation hearing due to appearance of partiality).
Cf. Disqualification of Knece, 688 N.E.2d 515, 516 (Ohio 1997) (judge who was prosecutor at time defendant
was prosecuted not required to recuse from defendant's revocation proceeding; former deputy prosecuted
criminal charge and represents prosecution in revocation case; judge denied any participation in defendant's
prosecution and did not recall discussing case with former assistant prosecutors; no appearance of partiality).
See also Marxe v. Marxe, 570 A.2d 44, 48 (N J. Super. Ct. 1989) (no appearance of partiality when judge's
former law clerk is employed byfirmrepresenting party in matter before the judge, but is not working on instant
case and did not work on instant matter as law clerk); Ward v. Ward, 895 R2d 749, 751 n.l (Okl. Ct. App. 1995)
(paralegal in community was party in case before judge; no appearance of partiality because professional
contact by bar and their staffs cannot be basis for disqualification; otherwise any lawyer or staff member who
went to trial would need new judge); Dixon v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994)
(current association between part-time trial commissioner and county attorney gives appearance of impropriety
so that the former cannot issue search warrants because she is not perceived as a neutral and detached
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to determine whether a judge is disqualified when a former law partner, associate
or co-counsel of the judge began the current representation after the termination
of the professional relation with the judge.
Any decision regarding disqualification of a judge for prior contact with an attorney
must be made with the understanding that judges often come to the bench after
having had extensive contacts with the community and the legal profession . . . . A
judge who arrives on the bench after years as a practicing attorney may have had
countless co-counsel relationships. To require disqualification for a prior co-counsel
association that is minimal and does not include a presentfinancialinterest or any
other business or social relationship would place a burden on the judicial system that
is in our opinion without justification.] 35
The case law is well-settled about the elements that a reasonable person,
knowing all the relevant facts, would consider in assessing the judge's
impartiality. Therefore, a "totality of the circumstances" framework for amending the Code's commentary follows:
When an allegation is made that a judge is presiding over the case in which a.
former law partner, associate or co-counsel of the judge began the current
representation after the termination of the professional relation with the judge,
as to require disqualification or discipline, some of the factors to be evaluated
include: (1) the nature and extent of the prior association;136 (2) the length of
time since the association terminated;137 (3) whether the judge continues to
benefit from the relationship;138 and (4) whether personal or social relationships derived from the professional relationship.139

magistrate); Annotation, 16 A.L.R.4th 550 (1982) (discussing judicial split on whether the head of an office such
as a district attorney or an attorney general must be disqualified under these standards).
135. Bonelli v. Bonelli, 570 A.2d 189, 193 (Conn. 1990). See ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1524 (1987) (judge not required to recuse just because judge had been associated
with counsel two years earlier; period of one or two years after terminating professional association appropriate,
depending on closeness of relationship and continued contact). See also III, SUP. CT. R. 63c(l)(c) (for three
years, automatically disqualifies a judge who was associated in private practice with counsel of record); State v.
Mustafoski, 867 P.2d 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (applies statute disqualifying judge who prosecuted defendant
less than two years before current case, regardless of connection between cases).
136. In re Bias, 947 P.2d 1152,1156 (Utah 1997) (same lawfirm);Bonelli, 570 A.2d at 192 (judge's personal
participation in prior case was limited and other attorneys actually managed the case; co-counsel relationship
nominal, especially when co-counsel were representing interests of different clients); Kinard v. Kinard, 986
S.W.2d 220,229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (office sharing); James v. James, 656 N.E.2d 399,404-05 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995) (same law firm).
137. In re Bias, 947 P.2d at 1156 (thirteen years since member of firm); Bonelliy 570 A.2d at 193 (fourteen
months clearly sufficient to attenuate possible impropriety from co-counsel relationship); Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at
229 (eight years since office sharing ended); James, 656 N.E.2d at 405 (seven months not sufficient lapse,
especially when Yellow Pages advertisement showed referee-judge and counsel associated in same law firm).
138. In re Bias, 947 P.2d at 1156 (no financial interest in firm); Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 229 (all financial ties
severed).
139. In re Bias (no appearance of partiality); Bonelli (same); Kinard (same); James (appearance of partiality
requires recusal).
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A judge's attitude toward an attorney practicing in the judge's court may raise
concerns about the appearance of partiality,140 especially when the attorney has
held a position of trust with the court. In two Alabama cases,141 active members
of the bar who served as guardians and conservators for their counties were
charged in highly publicized cases with embezzlement and theft from those
conservatorships and estates. Because reasonable persons would question the
impartiality of the judges, whose trust the defendants were charged with
breaching, the appellate court granted petitions for recusal of all the judges in the
respective circuits.
Allegations about the appearance of partiality due to the relationship between
judges142 also produce motions to disqualify. In the relatively common situation
where a case is remanded for resentencing, a litigant may attempt a challenge to
the new sentencing judge, even though the record fails to indicate any special
relationship between the judges. The theory for these unsuccessful motions to
disqualify is that a judge in the same circuit or geographic area is incapable of
putting aside feelings for the original sentencing judge to make an independent
decision about a proper sentence.143
Finally, although judges can engage in activities to improve the law, the legal
system, and the administration of justice, if in doing so they do not cast doubt on
their capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before them,144
litigants have tried to use judges' organizational affiliations as the basis for a
motion to disqualify. The leading case is State v. Knowlton145 where the
defendant attempted to use the judge's membership on a Governor's Task Force
for Children at Risk to remove the judge from his probation revocation hearing.
The appellate court compared the task force's composition and its responsibilities
with the treatment, probation, or punishment of child abusers like the defendant,
and refused to find that the judge's participation equated to his acting as an

140. In Consiglio v. Consiglio, 711 A.2d 765, 769 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998), the trial judge granted counsel's
motion to recuse in all pending matters handled by counsel. Less than three weeks later, the trial judge refused to
recuse in another of counsel's cases because the chief judge had ordered him to preside. The appellate court
reversed and ordered a new trial, stating that the "presiding judge does not have the power to tell a trial judge
when he or she may or may not recuse himself or herself," and that any reasonable person "would question the
trial judge's impartiality in hearing a case in which [counsel] represented one of the parties."
141. Ex parte Bryant, 682 So.2d 39,41-42 (Ala. 1996); Ex parte Price, 715 So.2d 856, 859 (Ala. Crim. App.
1997).
142. In Webb v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 226, 229-30 (Ky. 1995), at the time of defendant's drug trial
charges were pending against him based upon the burglary of the home of a fellow trial judge's father. Denial of
the defendant's motion to recuse, based upon the professional relationship between the judges, was upheld
because no facts were presented to create even an appearance of bias.
143. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209, 220 (Mo. 1996); State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 918 (Mo.
1996).
144. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4A(1) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 4A (1972).
145. State v. Knowlton, 854 P.2d 259 (Idaho 1993).
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advocate against persons like the defendant.146 Unless the movant can prove that
the agenda of an organization or committee is inconsistent with the duty to judge
impartially, the judge's mere membership does not present an appearance of
impartiality.147
E. CLAIMS FILED AGAINST OR BY THE JUDGE

Generally, litigants cannot eliminate judges they find to be unsatisfactory148 by
filing or threatening149 to file judicial conduct complaints150 or separate
lawsuits151 against those judges. Without proof of actual bias, the rationale for
finding no appearance of partiality is that a litigant should not be permitted to
"judge shop" by filing lawsuits against undesired judges. Conversely, a per se
recusal rule might cause a lawyer to withhold a legitimate complaint or claim
against a judge that could effectively preclude later appearance before the judge.
No appearance of partiality exists when the litigant files a separate lawsuit after
proceedings have begun, but a previous filing may raise the appearance.152
In the opposite situation, a judge's report of perceived attorney misconduct
also is insufficient to constitute an appearance of partiality so that the judge must
be disqualified in any proceeding where the attorney is counsel of record. In order
to maintain the integrity of the legal profession, when a judge receives

146.
A judge does not have an affirmative duty to withdraw from cases that merely tangentially relate to the
judge's participation in an organization or committee. To hold otherwise would deprive the citizens of
this state of the knowledge and experience that a judge brings to groups designed to improve the legal
system. Similarly, our citizenry would also suffer if we discouraged our judiciary from heightening
their knowledge and awareness of legal issues through participation in groups such as the Governor's
Task Force for Children at Risk.
State v. Knowlton, 854 P.2d at 263. In State v. Carlson, 833 R2d 463, 464-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), the court
noted that a similar motion lacked support and confused "a judge's efforts to improve the legal system with an
assumption of biased advocacy." See also State v. Haskins, 573 N.W.2d 39, 45 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (judge's
activities on domestic abuse coalition dealt with case management to improve general framework of system,
and did not indicate personal bias about a particular case).
147. See Yates v. Florida, 704 So.2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Harris, J., concurring) (an
example of a valid claim that the judge would not be fair in judging the movant would be if the agenda of the
organization advocates stiffer penalties for cases like the defendant's).
148. Ironically, the appearance of partiality may be created, not by filing a separate lawsuit or a motion to
disqualify, but by the judge's reaction to a motion to disqualify in the same matter. See, e.g., Williams v. Reed, 6
S.W.3d 916 (Mo. Ct App. 1999).
149. Dunlop Tire Corp. v. Allen, 725 So.2d 960, 978 (Ala. 1998) (threatened lawsuit unrelated to instant case
does not require recusal; no apparent partiality).
150. Filing judicial conduct complaints against the judge provides no grounds for a judge's recusal. See, e.g.,
Ball v. Melsur Corp., 633 A.2d 705, 709-10 (Vt. 1993) (old ethics complaint not basis for recusal); Keene v.
State, 938 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (contemporaneous complaint not grounds for recusal).
151. See, e.g., Farm Credit of St. Paul v. Brakke, 512 N.W.2d 718,721-22 (N.D. 1994); Los v. Los, 595 A,2d
381,385 (Del. 1991); Commonwealth v. Mercado, 649 A.2d 946, 961 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
152. See People v. Lowenstein, 325 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Mich. 1982) Gudge must recuse when he or she was
sued before the filing of current proceeding before him or her).
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information or has actual knowledge that substantial likelihood exists that a
lawyer has committed a violation'53 of the attorneys' rules of professional
conduct, he or she has an ethical duty to report such misconduct. As with lawyers
reporting judges, the finding of an appearance would discourage judges from
reporting questionable behavior to the bar association for fear of the consequences, e.g., motions to disqualify.154
In deciding whether such a complaint or lawsuit presents a disqualifying
appearance of partiality, several important factors that should be reflected in an
amended Code commentary: (1) whether the litigant is using the claim as a means
to judge shop or some other improper purpose; (2) the timing of the motion to
recuse or the filing of the lawsuit; and (3) whether there was a legitimate reason
for bringing the lawsuit.155
F. JUDGE'S PERSONAL CONNECTION WITH PROCEEDINGS
What should happen when the judge's attorney or an attorney for a party suing
the judge appears before the judge as counsel of record? The 1990 Code amended
the 1972 Code's ethical prohibition against personal bias or prejudice against a
party to include a party's attorney as well.156 Therefore, in states that use the 1990
Code, a motion to disqualify a judge because counsel of record is the judge's
attorney or the attorney for someone suing the judge usually is based upon the
personal bias provision. Litigants in states applying the 1972 Code must base
such a motion on the residual appearance of impropriety provision.
The key variables in evaluating the problem of the judge's attorney appearing
before the judge are whether the attorney's representation is current or past, as
well as whether the representation of the judge was in the judge's personal or

153. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(3) (1972); M.ODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3D(2) (1990). See generally Leslie W. Abramson, The Judges Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other
Judges and Lawyers and Its Effect on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 752 (1997).
154. See, e.g., 5-H Corporation v. Padovano, 708 So.2d 244, 248 (Fla. 1997); Joyner v. Commissioner of
Correction, 740 A.2d 424 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
A judge's conduct also may raise an appearance problem when he or she acts in the dual capacity of judge and
advocate. For example, in State v. Brown, 602 P.2d 478 (Ariz. 1979), after the judge noted consistencies between
the defendant's trial testimony and information listed on the defendant's pretrial release questionnaire, he gave
the court file to the prosecutor for review without contacting defense counsel. When the prosecutor did not act
on the information, the judge contacted the prosecutor's supervisor to explain the inconsistencies and to
investigate perjury charges against the defendant. After being advised by the judge of his actions, defense
counsel's motion for a change of judge was denied. On appeal, the court had no difficulty with the judge's
notification to the prosecutor about the perjury. However, the court held that going to the supervisor after finding
the prosecutor's response inadequate was reversible error because he "gave the appearance of abandoning his
role as a fair and impartial judge." Id. at 481.
155. Farm Credit of St. Paul, 512 N. W.2d at 721 -22.
156. Canon 3E(l)(a) of the 1990 Model Code declares that a judge must disqualify himself or herself from
presiding in a proceeding when he or she "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party s
lawyerr MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(a) (1990) (emphasis supplied).
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official capacity. American Bar Association Informal Opinion 1477157 asked
whether a "judge can properly sit in a case in which a litigant is represented by a
lawyer who is a private practitioner and who is concurrently acting as attorney for
the judge in unrelated litigation before another court, when the other litigation
pertains to the judge's official position or conduct.5' The response was a general
"no," regardless of whether the lawyer is charging the judge a fee and even if it is
the lawyer's associates and not the lawyer who is representing the clients before
the judge. "Only in unusual circumstances would a judge's impartiality not be
subject to reasonable question when a lawyer appearing before the judge in
behalf of a client is at the same time representing the judge in a personal matter or
in a matter pertaining to the judge's official position or conduct."158
The judicial decisions are not so clear about the necessity for recusal where
there is a client-attorney relationship between a judge and an attorney who is
concurrently practicing before the judge in an unrelated case. In the cases where
courts have ordered or upheld disqualification, the primary concern is the
appearance that the judge will be favorably disposed toward his or her own
attorney's client due to his or her own relationship with the attorney. For
example, in Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning,159 the appellate court issued a
writ of prohibition for the disqualification of a judge who was presiding over a
case in which one of the law firms was representing the judge and her spouse in a
separate, unrelated matter. Because the attorney-client relationship involves
confidentiality and financial arrangements, the court commented that it could not
"perceive a trial judge considering argument from counsel on a case then going to
counsel's office to discuss the judge's case."160 One court has described the
pertinent issues in this context.
Did the attorney represent the judge only as the nominal party in a mandamus
proceeding? Is the lawyer representing the judge as a defendant in an action
involving his office along with other public officeholders? Is the judge one of a
large class of plaintiffs in a class action? Is a lawsuit which affects the judge's
financial or personal well-being at issue? How close a relationship exists in
truth rather than merely in theory between the judge and the lawyer? What is

157. ABAComm. on Ethics and Profs Responsibility, Informal Op. 1477 (1981).
158. Id. See In re Disqualification of Badger, 546 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio 1989) (counsel in case pending before
judge represented the judge in an official capacity in unrelated case; disqualification of judge mandated). The
opinion noted that the "rule of necessity" may be applicable when a private lawyer with expertise in judicial
salaries or pensions represents all judges. It also indicated that it was not addressing the case of a judge being
represented in an official capacity by a state attorney general pursuant to the latter's legal duty to represent
judges in matters concerning their judicial responsibilities.
159. Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning, 631 So.2d 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
160. Id. at 1130. See also Marcotte v. Gloeckner, 679 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (law firm
represented both judge and insurer in case before judge in unrelated matters simultaneously; disqualification
ordered due to appearances).
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the attendant publicity that might affect the public's perception of impartiality?161
As another court observed, nearly every petition for extraordinary relief "has the
unfortunate consequence of naming the judge as a party and the judge is obliged
-to obtain personal counsel or leave his defense to one of the litigants appearing
before him."162
When the judge is either one of many public officials sued or one of a class of
plaintiffs seeking official or private redress, the relationship likely lacks the same
bond as when the attorney represents one party who happens to be a judge.163
Because any representation of the judge can influence the judge's personal
well-being, that factor is therefore neutral. Finally, the amount or nature of
notoriety may affect how the reasonable person perceives the appearance of a
judge's representation by an attorney appearing in the judge's court as counsel.
If an attorney's representation of the judge is in the past, regardless of its
purpose, some courts refuse to find an appearance of partiality in the absence of
proof reflecting bias or prejudice.l **
In appraising the significance of past representation . . . the fact that it is past
must be recognized. Thus, the appearance arising from the fact of past
representation will ordinarily be much less disturbing than the appearance
arising from concurrent representation. For it is more likely to appear to a
reasonable person that the judge's conduct of the trial might not be impartial
when one of the attorneys is, even as the trial is being held, representing the
judge.165

161. Lueg v. Lueg, 976 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1998).
162. Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 459 N.E.2d 374, 387 n.10 (W. Va. 1995). See In re
Union Pacific Resources Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. 1998) (Hecht, J., concurring) ("the relationship
between judge and lawyer is of less concern... when it involves no more than the lawyer's representation of the
judge as a respondent in a mandamus proceeding").
Cf. In re Disqualification of Morgan, 657 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Ohio 1990) (ju(*ge w a s represented in
prohibition action by prosecutor; plaintiff's counsel filed amicus curiae brief on behalf of client; no ongoing
attorney-client relationship between counsel and judge; disqualification denied); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins.
Co. of America, 774 P.2d 1003, 1023 (Nev. 1989) (attorney's appearance on behalf of amicus curiae does not
constitute representation of a litigant before the judge when the attorney also represented judge on unrelated
matter; no appearance of impropriety).
163. See Narro Warehouse, Inc. v. Kelly, 530 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (free legal services
provided to judge and other public officials by attorney who was counsel in condemnation case before judge did
not amount to appearance of partiality); Reiily by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 479
A.2d 973, 985 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (concurrently representing judge as one member of class does not require
recusal).
164. See, e.g., Sonner v. State, 930 R2d 707, 712 (Nev. 1996) (counsel had represented judge in unrelated
matter involving dissatisfied litigant); Murphy v. Murphy, 461 S.E.2d 39,42 (S.C. 1995); McKeague v. Talbert,
658 R2d 898, 905 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983) (counsel had represented corporation of which judge was minority
shareholder; no reasonable person would question judge's impartiality).
165. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 479 A.2d 973, 979 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984).
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However, recusal seems appropriate when the attorney now appearing before the
judge helped the judge avoid or attain a large monetary recovery. On the other
hand, no disqualification would be necessary if the attorney who wrote the
judge's estate plan ten years ago appears in the judge's court.
Past representation of a trial judge in his or her official capacity is the least
likely situation to arouse concerns about negative appearances, because the
representation is complete and related to the judge's public duties. In Reilly by
Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,{66 defense counsel
unsuccessfully sought the judge's recusal because opposing counsel had represented the judge in a class action seeking increased compensation for all state
trial judges. The court observed that "[w]ere we to hold that the trial judge should
have recused himself only because as a member of the class he had been
represented by [counsel], it would follow that no trial judge could preside in any
case in which [counsel] appeared,"167 thus requiring application of the rule of
necessity.
If counsel in the case at bar also is counsel for the judge's opponent or has
opposed the judge in an unrelated case, do the relevant factors for considering the
appearance of partiality vary? Only the nature of the appearance has shifted:
instead of an appearance that the judge favors his or her own attorney in the case
at bar, it may appear that the judge disapproves of the adversary-attorney. As with
the judge's own attorney, current opposition to the judge creates a more negative
appearance for the reasonable person than when the adversary relationship is
completed.168
Additions to the Codes' Canon 3 black letter standards or commentary based
on the foregoing discussion could produce the following language:
Whenever the judge is presiding in a case in which his or her attorney, or an
attorney opposing the judge in an unrelated case, the judge shall consider
recusal, giving appropriate significance to the following factors: (1) whether
the matter is current or complete; (2) whether the matter relates to the judge as a
public official or a private citizen, and, if the former, whether the judge is a
nominal party in a proceeding seeking an extraordinary relief such as
mandamus; (3) whether the judge is one of a large group of named plaintiffs or
defendants; and (4) whether the attorney has represented or opposed the judge
more than once.

166. id.
167. Id. at 980. See Yorita v. Okumoto, 643 P.2d 820, 825 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (attorney previously
appeared as special deputy attorney general to represent judge in negotiations with alleged contemnor after
judge issued contempt citation; no appearance of partiality).
168. Compare Ex parte Cotton, 638 So.2d 870, 872 (Ala. 1994) (counsel was past adversary of judge; no
appearance of partiality) with State v. Salazar, 898 P.2d 982, 987 (Ariz, Ct. App. 1995) ("a lawyer's [current]
representation of a party adverse to the judge suggests that the judge might disfavor that lawyer, to the detriment
of his client;" reversible error).
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Although the issue is not raised in the case law, the frequency of prior
representation of or opposition to the judge is relevant to whether a reasonable
person would believe that the judge appears to favor or disfavor the client
represented by the attorney.
Motions to disqualify judges may arise from more personal subjects than the
identity of the judge's attorney. The most well-known example arose in People v.
Hall,169 in which the judge, defense counsel, and the defendant were discussing
counsel's representation when the defendant struck his lawyer with a chair and hit
the judge with his fist. Defendant's motion to disqualify the judge was rejected at
the trial level and on appeal of his death sentence.
Judges are called upon to preside over the trial of onerous causes and persons.
By definition, however, a trial judge is required to ignore provocations and
pressures, whether public or from individuals... . [T]o hold that the law
requires a substitution of judges under circumstances similar or comparable to
those here would invite misconduct toward judges and lawyers, and a practice
would develop that the grosser the misconduct the better the chances to avoid
trial with an undesired judge or lawyer.170
Threatening or assaulting the judge fails to immediately equate with a disqualifying
appearance of partiality, because the offending party regulates when and how any threat
or assault on the judge occurs, thereby controlling the existence, nature, and timing of
any negative appearance. As a result, courts agree that a person should not derive any
benefit, such as a judicial disqualification, from his or her own misconduct.
If the judge shares some personal characteristic with some aspect of a pending case,
would a reasonable person knowing the facts find a disqualifying appearance of
partiality? For example, if the judge's relative had been murdered by a member of a
racial minority, is the judge disqualified from presiding over any murder trial in which
the defendant's race is the same as the judge's relative's murderer? The court in State v.
Shabazz171 stated that any such perception "would be based on nothing but speculation,
and not on any reasonable basis."172 Or, suppose the judge personally had been the
victim of criminal behavior comparable to the conduct alleged in the defendant's case.

169. People v. Hall, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (111. 1986). Other cases have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
State v. Bilal, 893 P.2d 674 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (defendant assaulted judge immediately after verdict; no
recusal); State v. Prater, 583 So.2d 520, 527-28 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (no appearance of impropriety forjudge to
sit in case after defendant sent threatening letters to judge during trial); People v. Page, 702 N.Y.S.2d 552,5555
(Nassau County Ct. 2000) (judge's viewing of post-verdict courtroom disturbance by defendant does not require
judge's disqualification from sentencing proceeding).
170. Hall 499 N.E.2d at 1347. In People v. Hall 626 N.E.2d 131, 135 (111. 1993), the defendant again
unsuccessfully challenged die judge he had assaulted, this time to prevent him from presiding over the
postconviction proceeding.
171. State v. Shabazz, 719 A.2d 440 (Conn. 1998).
172. Id. at 452. Mandatory disclosure of a judge's prior experiences can go too far. The judge, for example,
should not have to provide a de facto autobiography to the parties to give them an opportunity to match the
judge's experiences with some aspect of the case at bar, in order to seek the judge's disqualification.
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In State v. Mann,173 the court analogized the judge's situation as a child abuse victim to
a challenge for cause directed at a juror, suggesting that the length of time since the
judge's victimization, the similarity of the incidents, and the lack of familiarity with the
current victim were relevant considerations for assessing an appearance of partiality.
For these types of personal situations, new Code language forjudges should
include the following:
If a judge is presiding in a case in which the judge shares a characteristic or
circumstance with a party or the proceeding, the judge shall consider recusal,
giving appropriate significance to the following factors: (1) the judge's
familiarity with the party or the proceeding; (2) the nature and similarity of the
shared characteristic or circumstance; (3) the length of time since the origin of
the shared characteristic or circumstance; and (4) the identity of the person who
initiated the existence of the shared characteristic or circumstance.
G. FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
The Codes specifically prohibit a judge from presiding in a proceeding in
which he or she has a current family relationship. The Codes presume that a judge
is disqualified when the judge, the judge's spouse, a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of the last category of
relations is: (1) a party to the proceeding; (2) an officer, director, or trustee of a
party; (3) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (4) to have an interest known to
the judge that could be substantially affected by the result of the proceeding; or
(5) known by the judge to be a likely material witness in the case.174 Courts
examine other factual scenarios under the appearance of partiality standard.

173. State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Iowa 1994) (judge was victim of child sex abuse, and allowed to
sit in child kidnapping case). The analogy of evaluating some aspect of the judge's experience to a juror's
challenge for cause would be most appropriate for a bench trial where the court is the fact finder. See In re
Margaret Susan P., 733 A.2d 38, 42 (Vt. 1999) (judge's status as adoptive parent does not create appearance of
partiality in case seeking information about adoption); Williams v. Reed, 6 S.W.3d 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)
(counsel in child custody and support case where the concern was about custodial parent's same-sex
relationship moved for judge's recusal because judge was about to become involved in dissolution proceeding
in which the soon-to-be ex-spouse was involved in same-sex relationship and child custody would be an issue;
appearance of partiality given fact that prior to the hearing on the motion, the judge questioned counsel about
the source of and factual basis for the motion, judge called counsel's client to the witness stand, denied her
request to consult with her counsel, and threatened to hold her in contempt if she failed to follow his orders);
State ex rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (judge told parties that his own
divorce case's disposition of marital property was alternative he might consider if case went to trial; remanded
for evidentiary hearing on appearances); Commonwealth v. Urrutia, 653 A.2d 706, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(record failed to support recusal of judge from stalking case when judge was victim of stalking).
174. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(d)(i)-(iv) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3C(l)(d)(i)-(iv) (1972). The 1972 Code assumes more background knowledge by the reader when it
simply states that "the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system." MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(3) (1972). The 1972 Code's commentary proceeds to describe a third degree
relation as a "father, grandfather, uncle, brother, or niece's husband." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3C(3) cmt. (1972). In the 1990 Code, the third degree of relationship includes the above relatives, plus
great-grandparents and great-grandchildren. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (1990).
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Despite the perception that current Code standards exhaust the possibilities of
disqualifying involvement of a judge's relative with a proceeding, additional fact
patterns with appearance of partiality issues include: (1) the presence of relatives
beyond the third degree of relationship to the judge or the judge's spouse;175 (2)
any relative associated with counsel of record without being counsel of record;176
(3) any relative as the victim of a crime; or (4) any relative as an employee or a
shareholder in a party.177 In State u Logan™ the judge's son worked for the
prosecutor's office but the son was not even remotely involved in prosecuting
Logan. As a public servant, the son had neither a financial interest in the outcome
of the case or even a disqualifying reputation interest that was sufficient to create
an appearance of partiality. The court found it "unlikely that a reasonable person
would believe that a judge's propensity to convict criminal defendants would
increase because his son works as a prosecutor."179 Under the facts of that case,
the court probably reached the correct conclusion. However, if the judge's child

175. Relatives beyond the third degree of relationship to the judge may be emotionally, socially, and
financially closer to the judge than "biological'* family. In Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp.
Authority, 479 A.2d 973 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), defense counsel's attempt to disqualify the trial judge failed.
Counsel argued that the judge's step-nephew acted as counsel in the case under the specific provisions of the
Code, but the court found that a step-nephew is not within the Code's third degree of relationship. The appellate
court remanded the case to determine whether the step-nephew's participation the case, in combination with
other factors required recusal under an appearance of partiality standard. Id. at 985.
176. "The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is
affiliated does not of itself disqualify the judge." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990);
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C cmt. (1972).

177. While a party's employment of a judge's relative alone may not suggest that the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, other facts may be pertinent. For example, in the employment situation, the
number of employees, the nature of the judge's relative's position, and whether the relative's employment area
is involved in the case are relevant points. United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 170
Cal. App. 3d 97 (1985). Although the judge's experience with a strike was more personal than others, it was
unknown how the spouse's experience would affect the judge's view of the facts presented at trial. The judge's
spouse worked two days for an employer that filed a claim against a union arising from a strike occurring during
the spouse's employment. Because there was no continuing association between the employer and the judge's
spouse and the spouse was not involved in the events underlying the claim, a reasonable person could ask only if
the spouse's two-day employ would cause the judge to favor either the employer or the union. The court denied
mandamus relief because the union could not cite even one example of how the judge's first eight weeks of
presiding in the case supported an inference of partiality.
When a relative of the judge is associated with a party, can an appearance of partiality exist? In Buchanan v.
Buchanan, 587 So.2d 892 (Miss. 1991), counsel sought to disqualify the judge because the judge's son-in-law
was a dental student where the opposing party and five of her witnesses worked. The opposing party and the
witnesses were all alleged to be in a position to help the son-in-law with residency applications. Because the '
trial judge denied the motion without a hearing, the motion was remanded for a hearing.
178. State v. Logan, 689 P.2d 778 (Kan. 1984).
179. Id. at 785. See State v. Harrell, 546 N.W.2d 115, 116 (Wis. 1996) (no duty forjudge to disqualify when
spouse works in prosecutor's office, when spouse did not participate in or help prepare instant case); Trimble v.
State, 871 S.W.2d 562, 566-67 (Ark. 1994) (although the appearance generated by employing the judge's son
for the summer in prosecutor's office was "none too good," no disqualification).
The Logan concurrence found it "preferable . . . for a trial judge to recuse himself from the trial of criminal
cases or . . . to offer to do so on the record, when his son is an attorney on the staff of the local prosecutor"
regardless of the size of the prosecutor's office. Logan, 689 P.2d at 785-85 (Miller, J., concurring). See also
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had worked on the case, though not as counsel of record, reasonable people might
view the judge as "pro-prosecution," i.e., less than disinterested, impartial, and
independent because the judge's child would be affected by the case's outcome.
Other cases have handled recusal issues when a relative works for a private law
firm but is not counsel of record. For example, while a partner's possibility of
financial gain, as well as goodwill and reputation provides a disqualifying
"interest" necessitating judicial recusal, an associate attorney's employment
without being counsel of record may fall short even of an appearance of
partiality.180 Moreover:
there are circumstances in which a lawyer-relative and the affiliated law firm
may receive a sufficient nonpecuniary benefit to create an appearance of
impropriety requiring disqualification. Courts addressing this issue generally
identify the goodwill thefirmreaps as the implicated nonpecuniary interest. . ..
[C]ourts are concerned with situations where the law firm's reputation is
enhanced by the decision of the judge-relative so that, over time, thefirmand
the lawyer-relative in question will benefit sufficiently to create an appearance
of impropriety... . [T]he benefit to the lawyer in cases where goodwill and
reputation are enhanced is much more removed. As such, . . . the case before
the judge-relative must be one which will greatly affect thefirm'sreputation.l81
Because crime victims are not regarded as parties, the appearance of partiality
standard may be invoked when the judge's relative is the victim of a crime or is
affiliated with a crime victim.182 A judge's relationship could cause the judge to
be more sympathetic to the prosecution, to the extent the prosecution represented
the victim's interest. In State v. Alderson,™3 the judge informed counsel before a
Smith v. Beckman, 683 R2d 1214, 1216 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (judge precluded from presiding in case because
his spouse worked in the prosecutor's office; appearance of impropriety).
180. See, e.g., Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 391 (N.H. 1992) (trial judge's uncle was senior
partner in firm representing the city; judge recused when opposing counsel raised issue; "appearance of
partiality permeates the proceeding;" all orders of disqualified judge vacated); In re Moffett, 556 So.2d 723
(Miss. 1990) (appearance of partiality when judge's brother was senior partner in law firm representing party).
181. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 258 (Utah 1992). The court recognized further
that:
The simple model of an associate's drawing a fixed salary may not fit all law firms. To the degree that
a significant proportion of the associate compensation depends on factors analogous to those used in
fixing partner or shareholder compensation, similar ethical inquiries may be necessary... . Because
nonpecuniary interests that might enhance a firm's goodwill will result in benefits only over time, an
associate's lack of secure tenure with a firm, whether because of the probationary nature of an
associate's status or because of significant interfirm movement of young lawyers, reduces the
likelihood of long-term benefit such that disqualification is not necessary.
See also Washington v. Montana Mining Properties, Inc., 795 R2d 460,464 (Mont. 1990) (by itself, the judge's
son's legal internship with opposing law firm does not create appearance of impropriety; together with other
factors, recusal necessary).
182. See State v. Greene, 519 P.2d 651 (Kan. 1974) (when judge's second cousin is victim of robbery; no
disqualification because cousin not within third degree of relationship).
183. State v. Alderson, 922 P.2d 435 (Kan. 1996).
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felony murder trial that the vehicle that the defendant had allegedly driven at the
time of the shootings had belonged to his brother and had been stolen from his
father's house. The reviewing court upheld the trial judge's decision not to recuse
himself at trial after he learned that the defendant was not charged with theft of
the vehicle and that no one from his family would be called to testify. However, it
remanded the case for resentencing before another judge on the theory that a
reasonable person with full knowledge of the facts would question the
impartiality of a judge whose relative was a crime victim involving the defendant
who was being sentenced. As in other cases, Alderson's subtle insinuation is that
negative appearances matter only when the judge directly deals with the party,
but not when the jury is the fact-finder.
H. SOCIAL OR BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
Upon assuming judicial office, a judge does not have to "withdraw from
society and live an ascetic, antiseptic and socially sterile life."184 Because a judge
does have a life off the bench, occasionally challenges are made to disqualify the
judge based on those social or business relations. The Codes treat social dealings
either as constituting the appearance of partiality or as personal bias or prejudice.
In a small town, explicit acknowledgment by a judge that he or she knows all the
parties as well as the attorneys is merely a recognition of reality and does not call
the judge's impartiality into question.185 Recusal for social relationships could

184. United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 100 (1985). This
sentiment echoes the language of Canon XXXII from the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics:
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that a judge should live in retirement or
seclusion; it is desirable that, as far as reasonable attention to the completion of his work will permit,
he continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that he should not discontinue his interest in or
appearance at meetings of members of the bar. He should, however, in pending or prospective
litigation before him be particularly careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in influencing his
judicial conduct.
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS XXXII (1924).

185. See Kalapp v. State, 729 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (judicial comments about knowing
everyone in a small town does not equal an appearance of partiality).
See also In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 654 (R.I. 1992) ("[t]o hold that mere acquaintanceship between the
bench and bar requires recusal of the trial justice, particularly in a state the size of Rhode Island, would result in
a collapse of the state's judicial system;" no evidence offered supporting appearance of impropriety); State v.
Strayer, 750 P.2d 390, 396 (Kan. 1988) (judge's social acquaintance with prosecutor was no basis for
disqualification; "in a rural judicial district, it is to be expected that the district judges will be well acquainted
with the members of the bar, including the prosecutors;" no appearance of impropriety); State v. Whitlow, 988
S.W.2d 121, 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (appellate court discounted fact that judge had known theft victim's son
since high school and was a college fraternity brother; it was concerned that victim's son had served on a
committee which had nominated to the Governor the trial judge as a judge candidate; "[t]hat a judge knows
every attorney practicing in his circuit is common, especially in circuits the size of Platte County. That judges
know attorneys and even are members of the same organization do not, in themselves, create the appearance of
impropriety").
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effectively disqualify the judge from presiding over any case involving a local
party. Without judicial disclosure about social familiarity or business contact,
suspicions about a judge in a more populous place will depend upon someone
attaching an affidavit to a motion to disqualify about the judge's contact with a
victim, a party, an attorney, a witness, or the relatives of any of them.186 The
concern about appearances is that, as a result of the social or business contact, a
reasonable person knowing all the circumstances would believe that the judge
will accord different credibility to the testimony or statements of the person
known to the judge.
Social contact by the judge with a party or victim in a pending case can lead to
claims of the appearance of partiality. They may involve the judge's incredulity
that his or her friend could be charged with the crimes at issue, while others entail
allegations of animosity between the judge and a party.187 Most appearance of
partiality charges are unsuccessful, however. For example, in State u Wood,lss
the defendant sought recusal of the trial judge because the judge, the victim, her
family, the lead detective, and two of the lawyers in the firm appointed to
186.
There are countless factors that may cause some members of the community to think that a judge
would be biased in favor of a litigant or counsel for a litigant, e.g., friendship, member of the same
church or religious congregation, neighbors, former classmates or fraternity brothers. However, such
allegations have been found legally insufficient when asserted in a motion for disqualification.
MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332, 1338 (Fla. 1990). See Committee for Utility
Trimming, Inc. v. Hamilton, 718 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Ark. 1986) (no appearance of impropriety forjudge to sit in
case in which he had been a college roommate of a judge who opposed to appellant's lawyer in a political race).
187. Compare In re Conduct of Jordan, 624 P.2d 1074, 1075 (Ore. 1981) (judge told counsel that he could
not believe that the defendant had committed the acts charged; judge should have recused for appearance of
partiality) with In re Hill, 8 S.W3d 578, 584 (Mo. 2000) (judge and mayor of small town had public dispute;
judge ordered mayor's daughter and her boyfriend arrested for contempt, without bond, notice, or hearing;
judge should have recused for, inter alia, appearance of partiality; removal from office) and Leombruno v.
Leombruno, 540 N.Y.S.2d 925, 926 (1989) (judge anc* party-husband lived near each other and had
disagreements requiring police intervention; judge should have recused himself due to the "serious questions as
to the relationship . . . which could easily be interpreted by some as affecting the Justice's impartiality")- See
State v. Lee, 948 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (the judge declared a mistrial on the second day of trial
after seeing defendant's father and realizing that he socialized with the defendant's uncle frequently and the
father on occasion; the court upheld the mistrial declaration because the judge's familiarity with the family
could lead others to question his impartiality if sentencing became necessary).
One of the most egregious examples of an appearance of impropriety occurred when the judge was removed
from office for becoming socially involved and living with a criminal defendant in her court, and keeping his
court file without permission during which time some of his records disappeared. Mississippi Commission on
Judicial Performance v. Milling, 651 So.2d 531 (Miss. 1995). The judge also obtained a fugitive warrant on
behalf of the defendant and summarily dismissed it, and allowed him to drive her car on a suspended license. Id.
at 538.
See also In re Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 712 (Ind. 1998) (judge violated appearance of partiality when he
presided over child support proceedings involving party while having ongoing sexual relationship with her and
financially contributing to her support).
188. State v. Wood, 967 P.2d 702, 708 (Idaho 1998). The motion to recuse also alleged that the judge saw the
victim's father on a regular basis and that the judge had to rule on evidence about a purported church doctrine
offered to impeach church members who claimed that they were unfamiliar with "blood atonement."
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represent the defendant attended the same church. Without analysis, the court
held that judges do not have a duty to recuse merely because the case collaterally
relates to the judge's participation in the church.189
Social contact between a judge and counsel for a party during the pendency
of a case before the judge is discouraged. However, courts correctly refuse to
promulgate per se rules that "every chance meeting or a public social
discussion between judge and lawyer"190 requires judicial disqualification for
the appearance of partiality. In order to prove a negative appearance of
partiality, evidence of the duration of the encounter, the content of any
conversation, the circumstances of the meeting, and the frequency of
meetings are necessary elements of proof. As when the judge's counsel
appears before the judge, publicity about the judge's extrajudicial contacts
with litigation participants can lead a reviewing court to conclude that there
is an appearance of impropriety when the facts alone did not suggest
recusal.191
Concerns about a judge's business dealings also may lead to motions to
disqualify. A judge cannot sit in a case in which he or she owns controlling
interest in a bank that sues to foreclose a lien against a real estate owner, because
the Codes require recusal when a judge either has an interest relating to the
subject matter of the litigation or the judge's interest in the bank could be
substantially affected by the judge's decisions.192 Otherwise, judges ethically can
hold and manage investments, including real estate, as long as such dealings do
not reflect adversely on the judge's impartiality.193 Such an appearance of

189. In State v. Ross, 914 R2d 11 (Haw. 1999), the trial judge refused to recuse from a criminal case on the
grounds both that he monthly had sold fish to the store where the crime occurred and that he knew the store's
president. Reversing the court of appeals, the Hawaii Supreme Court found that the acquaintance would not
affect the judge's ability to preside. More important, the store was not a party, the trial would not affect the
market price the judge received from the fish sales, and the judge's connections to the store were unrelated to the
charged offense that concerned an individual victim. The court noted that "bad appearances alone do not require
disqualification." Id at 20, quoting Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir.
1994). However, in Volodkevich v. Volodkevich, 518 N.E.2d 1208 (Ohio 1988), the court found an appearance of
impropriety in a divorce case where the judge as an attorney had modified the parties' wills, he and his spouse
were social acquaintances with the parties, and that one counsel had represented him on one occasion and his
son on another.
190. Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 703 N.E.2d 1141, 1147 (Mass. 1998) (no appearance of
impropriety when judge had social contact with lead counsel for party in restaurant owned by judge's spouse
during pendency of trial).
191. See, e.g., Washington v. Montana Mining Properties, Inc., 795 P.2d 460, 464 (Mont. 1990) (newspaper
article about judge's social meeting with counsel in pending case contributed to "snowballing" of situation into
an appearance of impropriety).
192. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(c), 3E(l)(d)(iii) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL

CoNDUCTCanon 3C(l)(c), 3C(l)(d)(iii) (1972).
193. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4D(l)-(2) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 5C(l)-(2) (1972); Matter of Means, 452 S.E.2d 696, 698-99 (W. Va. 1994) (judge reprimanded under
Canon 5C(1) for continuing business dealings with attorney who appears before him).
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partiality exists when the judge jointly owns property with an attorney who
appears in the judge's court.194
New Code language covering a judge's social or business dealings should
include the following:
When a judge presides in a proceeding in which the judge (or the judge's close
relative) and an attorney, party, victim, or witness (or their close relative) have a
social or business relationship or contact, the judge shall consider recusal,
giving appropriate significance to the following factors: (1) the duration of the
relationship or contact; (2) the content of any conversation during the
relationship or contact; (3) the nature and circumstances of the relationship or
contact; (4) the frequency of meetings or conversations; (5) the personal
dependence of either on the relationship; (6) whether the relationship was
connected with the subject matter of the proceeding; (7) in a business
relationship, whether the judge receives preferential treatment not granted to
others; (8) whether the relationship has been the subject of media publicity; and
(9) statements attributable to the judge or any other person about the
relationship.
I. CAMPAIGNS AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
In states where voters elect their judges, candidates rely upon organizational
and financial backing from lawyers and law firms to support their campaigns. Is
the appearance of partiality present when a campaign supporter is counsel, a
litigant, or a witness in the judge's court? Should the answer depend on whether
the supporter is a campaign chairperson, or someone displaying a yard sign or a
bumper sticker to show support for the judge? Is a different answer appropriate
when the person in the judge's court opposes the judge's election?195 May judges
appear to be conducting the proceedings in their courts improperly, with an
approaching election in mind?196
194. See In re Fiftieth District Court Judge, 483 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Mich. 1992) (when judge and law firm
owned lot on which law firm's building is located, joint liability of judge and law firm gives appearance of
impropriety; financial ties between judge and law firm required recusal without any showing of actual bias or
prejudice). See generally Cynthia Gray, The Judge as Landlord, 23 VT. B. J. & L. DIG. 19 (June 1997)
(discussing split in judicial ethics advisory opinions when attorney rents office space in building owned by
judge).
195. Without more, no appearance of partiality is raised by the presence of a future or past candidateopponent as counsel in a case assigned to the judge's court. See, e.g., In re Disqualification of Bumside, 657
N.E.2d 1346 (Ohio 1992) (counsel had filed papers to be candidate opposing the judge; no indication that
judge's continued participation in case could reasonably be questioned); Ex parte Grayson, 665 So.2d 986, 987
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (one of party's lawyers opposed judge in most recent election and lost; "lawyer who
becomes candidate for the public office of judge accepts the risk that, if he loses, he may have to try cases in the
court of his successful opponent;" no appearance of partiality). See also McFarland v. State, 707 So,2d.l66, 180
(Miss. 1997) (merely because a judge hears an election case when the judge in the future may run for reelection
does not alone give rise to appearance of partiality).
196. For example, in Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Ky. 1992), two murder convictions
were reversed, in part because the judge insisted on a trial date just prior to election day. The court found that
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It is not surprising that counsel file motions to recuse when adversary counsel
supports the judge-candidate. Caleffe v. Vitale197 granted a petition for a writ of
prohibition, after the trial judge denied the motion to disqualify in a postdissolution proceeding because the ex-spouse's lawyer was co-chair of the
judge's reelection campaign. 'The fact that attorneys are generally encouraged to
support candidates for judicial office and do so, has little to do with the propriety
of an attorney practicing in a particular case before a judge with whom he or she
has a specific and substantial political relationship."198
Unlike Caleffe, in State u Carlson,199 defense counsel moved to disqualify one
judge on the appellate panel because the prosecutor was the honorary co-chair of
the judge's campaign. Because the prosecutor did not personally argue cases in
the appellate court, but appeared through his deputy prosecutors, defendant's
argument would disqualify the judge from hearing any case from the prosecutor's
office.200 The court did observe that a legitimate issue would arise if the
prosecutor personally argued the defendant's case. Also, the court recited several
factors relevant to determining the appearance issue when a campaign chairperson is a prosecutor: (1) the prosecutor's specific role in the instant case; (2) the
size of the prosecutor's jurisdiction; and (3) unusual circumstances like the
publicity surrounding the case or controversy about the prosecutor's handling of
201

certain cases.
The 1972 ABA Code warns judges against involvement in political activity,
but acknowledges that elected judges cannot disassociate themselves completely
from political organizations and campaign activities.202 The commentary to the
1990 Code states: "Though not prohibited, campaign contributions of which a
judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or others who appear before the judge . . .
may be cause for disqualification."203 When a judicial campaign contributor
u

[i]t would not be unreasonable to argue that [the judge] stood to gain significant public favor by conducting a
trial in which a guilty verdict was returned in this high-profile case, shortly before the November election." See
Ex parte Adkins, 687 So.2d 155 (Ala. 1996) (transfer of postconviction petition to another judge ordered;
election weeks away could have affected the way judge conducted trial).
197. Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
198. Id. at 629. In addition, a letter from the counsel-campaign co-chair to the judge added to the appearance
of a special relationship and substantiated the opposing party's fears about receiving a fair trial. In the letter,
counsel asked for the judge's "judiciousness and wisdom" in seeking a different approach to contempt hearings.
199. State v. Carlson, 833 R2d 463 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
200. Carlson, 833 P.2d at 465 n. 1. As to whether a reasonable person would perceive an appearance of
impropriety, the court noted a "vast difference" between a trial judge's and an appellate judge's role regarding
the possibility of a personal relationship such as a campaign chairperson influencing the judge. One judge
cannot control a three-judge panel, and appellate courts address legal issues rather than their own exercise of
discretion. Id. at 468.
201. Id. at 468.
202. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(1) (1972). See Roe v. Mobile County Appointment
Board, 676 So.2d 1206, 1232-33 (Ala. 1995) (Code section not authority for recusals of judge based upon f\ve
hundred dollar contribution from judge to judicial candidates).
203. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2) cmt. (1990).
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opposes them in a case before the judge, litigants seek the judge's disqualification. Occasionally, the amount of a contribution will constitute the appearance of
partiality, "placing the integrity of the judicial system in a subservient role to the
political process."204 In Breakstone v. MacKenzie,205 the court held that a five
hundred dollar contribution by counsel to the judge's spouse's judicial campaign
was a legally sufficient basis to disqualify the judge from the case. "In the real
world the facts . . . give the appearance of partiality, justifying a recusal,
notwithstanding the judge's genuine ability to maintain neutrality."206 The
Florida Supreme Court vacated the ruling that a five hundred dollar contribution
disqualified the judge, but upheld the order disqualifying the judge under the
specific facts of the case.207 However, generally, the motion is denied, not
because of the absence of an appearance of partiality but because of the reality of
conducting a judicial campaign.208
It is not surprising that attorneys are the principal source of contributions in a
judicial election. We judicially know that voter apathy is a continuing problem,
especially injudicial races and particularly in contests for a seat on an appellate
bench. A candidate for the bench who relies solely on contributions from
nonlawyers must reconcile himself to staging a campaign on something less
than a shoestring. If a judge cannot sit on a case in which a contributing lawyer
is involved as counsel; judges who have been elected would have to recuse
themselves in perhaps a majority of the casesfiledin their courts. Perhaps the
next step would be to require a judge to recuse himself in any case in which one
of the lawyers had refused to contribute or, worse still, had contributed to that
judge's opponent.209
Because some judges ignore the appearance of partiality concept when lawyers
and parties appear before the judges they support financially, in 1998 the
American Bar Association appointed an Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial
Campaign Finance to review recommendations about election contributions that
arose from a special Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions. To ensure

204. Keane v. Andrews, 581 So.2d 160, 161 (Fla.1991) ($3,850 contribution from opposing law firm was
17.5% of judge's campaign contributions; appearance of partiality).
205. Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So.2d 1164 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
206. Id. at 1173 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
207. See MacKenzie v. Breakstone, 565 So.2d 1332 (Ha. 1990).
208. See, e.g., Roe v. Mobile County Appointment Board, 676 So.2d 1206,1232 (Ala. 1995) (no appearance
of partiality for three appellate judges to donate to fellow judge's campaign); MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain
Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332, 1335 (Ha. 1990) (allegation that counsel or litigant has made legal $500 campaign
contribution to trial judge or trial judge's spouse not legally sufficient ground for recusal; no appearance of
partiality); Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (contribution was solicited by judge;
contribution was small; contributing lawyer was not lead attorney; no abuse of discretion in denial of recusal
motion).
209. Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). See Hans A. Linde, The Judge as Political
Candidate, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1992); Stuart Banner, Disqualifying Elected Judges From Cases
Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449,465-66 (1988).
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the judicial independence of an elected judiciary, the 1999 ABA House of
Delegates adopted specific language in a new Canon 3(E)(1)(e), calling for
mandatory disqualification when:
(e) the judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party or a
party's lawyer has within the previous [***] year[s] made aggregate*
contributions to the judge's campaign in an amount that is greater than [ [ [[
[$ ***] for an individual or [$ ***] for an entity]] ] ] [[is reasonable and
appropriate for an individual or an entity]].210
Coupled with the 1990 Code's, narrowly-based judicial duty keep informed about
various subjects,211 the new Code provision is incomplete. Under the 1990 Code,
a judge does not have to keep informed about contributions. Is there not an
appearance of partiality when a contribution satisfying the threshold amount and
donor identity has been made, though the judge is unaware of the contribution or
the specific amount and without a motion for recusal? If the judge or opposing
counsel learns about the contribution after the proceedings have begun, should
not the fact of a contribution be disclosed, even by the donor, at the beginning of a
proceeding, to avoid squandering judicial resources?
Presumably, contributions by a witness or on behalf of a party or a party's
lawyer will still be addressed under the residual appearance of impropriety
section. Each state can decide what period of time applies to lawyer or party
contributions. Because contributions may take different forms and may be made
directly or indirectly, the aggregate212 of contributions is important. The ABA
Committee raised concerns that application of specific contribution limits could
result in some lawyers or parties contributing to a judge's campaign "solely" in

210. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(e) (1990), as amended. The provision was part of a
group of recommendations, which dealt with judicial selection procedures, appointments by judges,
disqualification, and campaign contribution limits, reporting and disclosure. The Committee also discussed
public campaign financing of judicial elections and surplus campaign funds, concluding that they required
further consideration.
The Model Code amendment to Canon 3E is intended to be applicable whenever judges are subject to public
election. Where specific dollar amounts determined by local circumstances are not used, the "reasonable and
appropriate" language should be used. ABA Ad Hoc Comm. On Judicial Campaign Finance, Am. Bar Ass'n,
Report to the House of Delegates (May 5,1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/adhoc599.html (visited
March 6, 2000). The issue of specific dollar limits is "up to individual jurisdictions, recognizing that
jurisdictions vary with respect to the cost of judicial campaigns, the size of the electorate, the availability of
alternative sources such as public funding, and other factors." Conference Report: ABA Annual Meeting, 15
LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 396,399 (August 18,1999).

211. See supra note 53 and accompanying text
212. "Aggregate:"
denotes not only contributions in cash or in kind made directly to a candidate's committee or treasurer,
but also, except in retention elections, all contributions made indirecdy with the understanding that
they will be used to support the election of the candidate or to oppose the election of the candidate's
opponent.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (1990), as amended.
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order to disqualify the judge, but proposals considered by the Committee were
rejected as "unworkable."213
CONCLUSION

The appearance of impropriety is the basis in most states for judicial
disqualification and discipline when specific ethical standards are too narrow to
include the facts under review. While this Article has noted reviewing courts'
application and interpretation of this catch-all Code provision, the rule invites
uncertainty or unwillingness by those who should apply it. To change that
approach, this Article has offered specific ideas for improving the ABA Codes of
Judicial Conduct or comparable state codes by supplementing current ethical
norms. The common law of judicial disqualification shows that no set of rules can
anticipate every disqualifying situation that may arise. Nevertheless, sufficient
experience applying even the general appearance of impropriety rule can produce
useful guidelines for the judges, counsel, and judicial conduct organizations
responsible for Code interpretation and application. Reviewing ethical standards
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and might reduce
public impatience with the legal system's regulation of itself.

213. ABA Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Campaign Finance, Am. Bar Ass' n, Report to the House of Delegates
(May 5,1999).
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